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Privileges: Spousal, Attorney-Client, and Priest-Penitent 
United States Tax Court 
February 26, 2004 
Prof. Lynn McLain 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
I. Privileges in General 
A. Privileges and Their Underlying Rationale 
Even relevant, highly reliable evidence may not be the proper subject of either discovery 
or proof, because it is protected by a privilege. Some privileges have been recognized by the 
federal courts as being constitutionally mandated. Some, such as the tax practitioner privilege 
ofI.R.C. § 7525, are statutory. Otherwise, when federal substantive law applies, Fed. R. Evid. 
501 provides that privileges will be governed by the "principles of the common law" as 
interpreted by the federal courts "in the light of reason and experience." 
Privileges fall into two categories: those that protect only confidential communications 
made within the context of a particular type of relationship and those that protect even 
non-confidential information. Among the first are the attorney-client privilege and the 
husband-wife confidential communications privilege. Among the second are the husband-wife 
"spousal immunity" or "anti-marital facts" privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Generally, privileges have been recognized in order to encourage certain types of 
communications or relationships, the importance of which is considered greater in the 
aggregate for the promotion of justice, public health, and social stability than is the cost of 
excluding important evidence in particular cases. I For example, the attorney-client privilege is 
believed to enable full and frank discussions between attorney and client, which will enhance the 
likelihood that the client receives adequate representation; the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
is believed to encourage mentally ill persons to seek psychiatric care; the husband-wife 
privileges are believed to shore up the institution of marriage. 
In expounding on this traditional "instrumental" rationale given for privileges, 
Wigmore states that the following four conditions must be met in order to justify the creation of a 
privilege: 
ISee Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Privileges are proper "only 
to the very limited extent that [they have] a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing 
all rational means for ascertaining truth."); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 at 269 (J. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992) 
(hereinafter referred to as "McCormick"). See generally E. Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY 
PRIVILEGES (2 vols.) (Aspen 2002) (hereinafter referred to as "Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE"); Developments 
in the Law. Privileged Communications, 98 HARV.L.REV. 1450 (1985). 
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(l) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal 
of litigation? 
Under that "instrumental" rationale, privileges should not be recognized unless the 
communications would be deterred if there were no privilege. But because it is unlikely, for 
example, that one spouse considers the availability of a husband-wife privilege before confiding 
in the other, this traditional rationale alone may not justify the spousal, as well as certain other, 
privileges.3 If these privileges are to be honored, then they must be supported by a second 
rationale: perhaps the individual's right to privacy or autonomy,4 or perhaps the unseemliness of 
the courts' prying into certain relations that society wishes to encourage.s 
B. Strict Construction of Privileges Except for the Privilege Against Self-
In crimina tio n 
"8 J. Wigmore, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (rev.1961) (emphasis omitted) (hereinafter referred to as 
"Wigmore"). 
3 1 McCormick § 72 at 270. 
4Id. & § 77; Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo.LJ. 61, 85-100 (1973); Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE, Preface at xlviii-xlix, ch. 5, 
& § 10.4 (suggesting "autonomy or decisional privacy" as "the preferable basis for a new, humanistic privilege 
theory"); Louisell, Privileges in Federal Court, 31 TULANE L.REv. 101 (1956). See generally Note, Circling the 
Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173 (1985). 
5 See 2 Louisell & Mueller, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 219 at 892-93 (1985) ("Three reasons, closely related, support 
the existence of the privilege. One is that human privacy ought to be respected, specifically in the context of the 
marital relationship, and in the twentieth century this principle has in related contexts attained constitutional status. 
Another is that it is unseemingly, even offensive to many, to use the power of the state to force revelation of marital 
confidences. Yet another is that this protected privacy, and the confidence between spouses which it encourages, are 
utterly essential to the complete fulfillment of marriage. Consequently, it is fair to say that the privilege provides 
support for the institution of marriage itself~a proposition which is sound even if it be conceded that spouses do not 
consciously rely upon the privilege of confiding in one another."). 
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Because privileges exclude relevant, reliable evidence, as a general matter, they are 
strictly construed, because they exclude relevant, reliable evidence.6 The privilege against 
self-incrimination, however, must be liberally construed "'in favor of the right it was intended to 
secure. ",7 
C. Invocation, Waiver, and Duration of Privileges 
A privilege may be invoked either by its holder or by another person present, 
including the judge, on the holder's behalf. 8 The party or person seeking to invoke the 
privilege has the burden of proving necessary preliminary facts, to the trial judge's 
satisfaction under Fed. R. Evid. l04(a), by a preponderance of the evidence.9 
Only the holder of a privilege may complain on appeal with regard to the violation of 
the privilege. [0 Therefore, if the holder of the privilege is not a party to the case, the violation of 
a privilege will not be reversible error, and the holder will not have waived the privilege in any 
subsequent litigation. For these and other practical reasons, such as the inability to assess 
foundational facts, trial judges are cautioned against sua sponte excluding evidence on the 
6E.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, (2003); University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 (1982); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever [privileges'] origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.") 
(footnote omitted). See United States v. Mandel, 415 F.Supp. 1025, 1030 (D.Md.1976) ("Since privileges by their 
very nature take from the trier of fact's consideration evidence which is frequently relevant, and are therefore 
considered to be in 'derogation of the search for truth,' the law sustains a claim of privilege only when necessary to 
protect and preserve the interest of significant public importance that the specific privilege is designed to serve. ") 
(citation omitted), ajJ'd in part & vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.1979), ajJ'd on rehearing en banc by 
equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); I McCormick § 
74 at 275 ("Since privileges operate to deny litigants access to every person's evidence, the courts have generally 
construed them no more broadly than necessary to accomplish their basic purposes."). 
7E.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955). 
8 1 McCormick § 73.1 at 272-73. 
9See United States v. Tedder, 80 I F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986) (proponent of a privilege must prove its 
applicability); Zaentz v. Comm'r, 73 T.e. 469, 475 (1979). Compare, e,g., Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc" 
979 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992) (de novo review appropriate as to admissibility of evidence allegedly protected by 
attorney-client privilege, as posing a mixing question oflaw and fact), opinion vacated, 1993 WL 524680 (4th Cir. 
1993) with United States v. Frederick, 99-1 U.S.T,e. ~ 50,465 (7th Cir. 1999) (standard of review in Seventh 
Circuit is one of "clear error"). 
10 1 McCormick § 92 at 340, But see Cal.Evid.Code § 918 (West 1966) (permitting a party to "predicate error on 
a ruling disallowing a claim of privilege by his spouse"). 
The improper exclusion of evidence, however, in deference to a non-party's privilege, may be the proper 
subject of complaint on appeal. I McConnick § 73.1 at 272-74, 
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ground of privilege. I I The question of appealability of an order to disclose allegedly privileged 
matters is somewhat unsettled. 12 
All privileges may be waived, but only by their holder (the person who is sought to be 
protected by the privilege) or the holder's agent. J3 Once a privilege has been waived, it cannot 
be resuscitated. 14 The party relying on a waiver of a privilege has the burden to show waiver, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, to the trial judge's satisfaction under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). 
Waiver will be effected by the holder's voluntarily disclosing or consenting to 
disclosure, outside another privileged setting, of any significant part of the privileged 
communication or matter. IS Waiver may be effected by voluntary production of privileged 
I I Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 65.3. 
12Compare Summons v. City of Racine, 37 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1994) (no interlocutory appeal lay under collateral 
order doctirne regarding order to disclose informant's identity, though mandamus would lie if court's decision were 
clearly erroneous) and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 857, 860-6 I (3d Cir. 1994) 
(although discovery order denying privilege was not applicable under the collateral order doctrine, mandamus 
jurisdiction did lie where trial court had committed clear errors of law) with United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 
F.3d 6 I 2 (D.e. Cir. 2003) (finding jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine to review discovery order rejecting 
claim of attorney-client privilege as to memorandum) (over dissent of Randolph, J.) and Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. 
Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d I 122 (7th Cir. 1997), reh 'g & reh 'g en bane denied (1997) (distinguishing Racine when order 
is against a non-party). See generally Gimbal, Appellate Review of Orders Compelling the Disclosure of Attorney-
Client Communications: Practical Finality, Mandamus, Contempt, and Evidentiary Preclusions, Trial Evidence 
(Vol. V, no. 3, Summer 1996). 
I3See United States v. Campbell, 73 F.3d 44 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (trustee of a limited partnership in 
bankruptcy has power to waive partnership's attorney-client privilege). 
14The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 5 I I explains: 
By traditional doctrine, waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464,58 S.Ct. 1019,82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). However, in the confidential privilege 
situations, once confidentiality is destroyed through voluntary disclosure, no subsequent claim of privilege 
can restore it, and knowledge or lack of knowledge of the existence of the privilege appears to be irrelevant. 
California Evidence Code § 9 I 2; 8 Wigmore § 2327 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). 
15E.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), reh'gdenied, 341 U.S. 912 (1951); Hawkins v. Stables, 
148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998) (waiver by denial that a privileged conversation took place); United States v. Premises 
Known as 28 I Syosset Woodbury Rd., 7 I F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995) (marital communications privilege waived as to 
post-arrest conversations when wife had testified freely to pre-arrest conversations); United States v. Jones, 696 
F.2d 1069, I 072-73 (4th Cir. 1982) (dissemination of opinion letters defeated attorney-client privilege); In re Grand 
Jury Investigation, 604 F.2d 672,675 (D.e.CiL 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 9 I 5 (I 979); Suburban Sew 'N Sweep 
Inc. v. Swiss-Bern ina, Inc., 9 I F.R.D. 254, 260-61 (N.D.llI.l981) (attorney-client privilege waived as to client's 
drafts of letters to attorney, which client threw in garbage); United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F.Supp. 133 1,1334 
(D.Md. 1980) (both disclosure by defendant to IRS agents at investigatory interviews and statements made by 
counsel, acting on defendant's behalf, waived attorney-client privilege); 8 Wigmore § 2276 (rev. 196 I & Supp. 
1996); Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.e. 677, 685 (1995) (attachment to tax return); Hartz Mountain Indus. v. 
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matter during discovery. Although the cases vary with regard to the effect of inadvertent 
disclosure, which often occurs during discovery,16 most cases find waiver to have been effected 
when disclosure was inadvertent and the holder had taken insufficient precautions against it, or 
even if the holder had taken reasonable precautions, the holder failed to promptly take 
appropriate curative action after the disclosure. 17 
Waiver will result if the holder of the privilege puts in issue in a judicial proceeding the 
subject matter of the privileged information or communications, or otherwise raises a claim 
or defense which, in fairness, requires that the opposing party be able to inquire into or 
Comm'r, 93 T.e. 521 (1989) (house counsel's sworn summary of internal position). 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511, which was not enacted but is declarative of the common law, provided: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or 
communication waives the privilege ifhe or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily 
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does 
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511 explains: 
The rule is designed to be read with a view to what it is that the particular privilege protects. For 
example, the lawyer-client privilege covers only communications, and the fact that a client has discussed a 
matter with his lawyer does not insulate the client against disclosure of the subject matter discussed, 
although he is privileged not to disclose the discussion itself. See McCormick § 93. The waiver here 
provided for is similarly restricted. Therefore a client, merely by disclosing a subject which he had 
discussed with his attorney, would not waive the applicable privilege; he would have to make disclosure of 
the communication itself in order to effect a waiver. 
Unif.R.Evid. 510, which is identical in substance to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511 but more succinct, provides: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he or his 
predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant 
part of the privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. 
In Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 2003 TNT 180-15 (D. Md. 2003) (discussed in Raby & Raby, Catch-
22 in "Reasonable Expectations" of Privilege and Confidentiality, Tax Notes, Feb. 23, 2004, at 101 1-12), the 
magistrate judge upheld the taxpayer's disclosure of a memorandum on which it relied as a defense to any possible 
claim for penalties, which was conditioned on the fact that that disclosure would not result in a wholesale subject 
matter waiver). 
16See. e.g., McCafferty's Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 129 F.R.D. 163 (D. Md. 1998); 6 L. McLain, MARYLAND 
EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 503: 17 nn.42-45 and 519:2 nn.4-8 and accompanying text (Thompson/West 2d 
ed. 200 I & Supp. 2003) (hereinafter referred to as "MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL"). 
17See, eg., United States v. Rigus, 281 F.Supp.2d 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (under circumstances, no waiver of 
attorney work product by government). 
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prove privileged matters.18 Failure to produce privileged information so made relevant may 
preclude that claim or defense. 19 
In Johnston v. Commissioner, the Tax Court applied the following three-pronged test, 
which is the approach endorsed both by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which appeal would have been taken 
in Johnston: "(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as 
filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put 
the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of 
the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his 
defense. * * *,,20 The Tax Court noted that several other approaches may be found in the federal 
case law, including another balancing test (First Circuit), a test resulting in "automatic waiver" 
by asserting a claim of defense making the privileged information relevant (S.D.N.Y.), and a test 
finding waiver only if a litigant directly injects the privileged matter into issue (Third Circuit). 
The Tax Court had previously quoted the District of Columbia case "with positive implication.,,21 
In a 2003 application of this three-pronged test, the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey considered a discovery dispute in an IRS claim for a corporation's income 
tax liabilities. 22 The taxpayer raised reliance-on-counsel reasonable cause as an affirmative 
defense to an accuracy related penalty. That affirmative act put privileged information at 
issue, and to apply the privilege would have prejudiced the government. The court held the 
privilege to have been waived. 
18Fannon v. Johnson, 88 F.Supp.2d 753 (E.D.Mich.2000) (police officer defending false arrest action, in which it 
was alleged that officer entrapped narcotics arrestee in order to supply officer's own drug habit, testified "pertaining 
to" content of confidential communications in officer's past drug abuse treatment, as required to compel disclosure 
of treatment records under PHSA, by stating that he had been only sporadic user of cocaine at time of alleged false 
arrest, not addict); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F.Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.e.1978) Uournalist waived his journalist's 
privilege regarding sources by suing with regard to alleged conspiracy that sought to retaliate against his sources); 
Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 132-33 (E.D.Pa.1975) (plaintiff waived attorney-client 
privilege by bringing suit against insurer, who, under facts, must be treated as joint client in original matter); 
Johnston v. Comm'r, 119 T.e. 27 (2002) (applying three-pronged test. See Whatley v. Merit Distribution Servs., 
191 F.R.D. 655, 660-61 (S.D.Ala.2000) (a party may be equitably estopped from asserting a privilege if the party has 
made false statements, e.g., in an employment application). 
19See Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Kryphon Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1195-96 
(9th Cir. 200 I) (defense of reliance on counsel properly precluded when client failed to answer questions regarding 
relevant communications until the eleventh hour). 
20 I 19 T.e. 27 (2002). 
21Jd.(citingKarmev.Comm'r, 73 T.C. 1163, 1184(1980),ajJ'd,673 F.2d 1062 (9thCir. 1982». Scealsoid. 
(citing Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.e. 677, 691 (1995) as having employed a consistent test). 
221n re G-I Holdings, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003). 
-6-
In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to 
reach the issue of whether a wife's raising the innocent owner defense in civil forfeiture 
proceedings waived her marital communications privilege.23 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)( 5) dictates that a party must notify other parties if it is withholding 
materials otherwise subject to disclosure, because it is asserting a claim of privilege. Failure to 
give such notice may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege. 
If a party uses privileged material to refresh a witness' recollection, the party waives the 
privilege with regard to the item or items used?4 
Most privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, extend beyond the death of the 
holder. 
D. Possible In Camera Review 
Whether to undertake an in camera review of allegedly privileged documents is, 
generally, a matter for the exercise of the trial court's discretion/5 when a showing has been 
made, through legally obtained, nonprivileged evidence, of a sufficient factual basis to support 
a reasonable person's good faith belief that an in camera review may show that an 
exception to the privilege applies. 26 
In Penmylvania v. Ritchie,27 however, the United States Supreme Court held that, 
although a person accused of a sex crime against a child has no constitutional right to inspect 
confidential files of a child welfare agency that reflect the victim's statements regarding abuse, 
23United States v. Premises Known as 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 71 F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995). 
24E.g., Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 223-24 (4th Cir. 1980) (state prosecutor waived work product 
privilege by having witness testify about "amended" pretrial statement); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. II, 
13 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Cf Georgou v. Fritzshall, 1996 WL 73592 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1996), subsequent proceeding, 
178 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 1999) (if a party discloses privileged material to a testifying expert, the material must be 
disclosed to opposing parties). 
25E.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94,101 n.IO (D.e. Cir. 1984); Mason e. Day Excavating. Inc. v. 
Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 143 F.R.D. 601,604 (M.D. N.e. 1992). 
26United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). See, e.g., Hartz Mountain Ind. v. Comm'r, 93 T.e. 521, 524 
(1989); Traficant v. Comm'r, 89 T.e. 501, 502 n.3 (1987) (Fifth Amendment); Branerton Corp. v. Comm'r, 64 
T.e. 191,201 (1975) (government privilege); P.T.&L. Constr. Co. v. Comm'r, 63 T.e. 404, 411 (1975) (executive 
privilege); Hospital Corp. of America v. Comm'r, T.e. Memo 1994-100. Cf Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305 (4th 
Cir.1995) (defense made sufficient showing to trigger right to in camera examination of Brady material). 
27Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
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the trial court must review the files in camera to determine whether information is "material" to 
the defense. 
II. Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Flexibility of the Common Law 
In cases where federal substantive law applies,28 Fed. R. Evid. 501 provides simply that 
privileges, except as constitutionally mandated or provided by statute, "shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law" as interpreted by the federal courts "in the light of reason and 
experience." Rule 501 is a far cry from the proposed rules regarding privilege drafted by the 
Advisory Committee and forwarded to Congress by the Supreme Court during the Nixon 
administration. 
A. Rule 501 as a Fail-Safe to Proposed Article V 
Proposed Article V would have codified nine privileges: (1) required reports 
privileged by statute, (2) attorney-client, (3) psychotherapist-patient, (4) husband-wife 
testimony against a spouse who is a criminal defendant, (5) clergy-penitent, (6) political 
vote, (7) trade secrets, (8) state secrets and other official information, and (9) informer's 
identity. It would have done away with the husband-wife confidential communications privilege 
and codified only a privilege against adverse spousal testimony in a criminal proceeding. 
Recognition of other privileges neither required by the Constitution nor enacted by statute 
would have been precluded. 
Proposed Article V was so controversial that the passage of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was threatened. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, critics lambasted the proposed 
privilege for governmental secrets, which exceeded that extended at common law. 
In order to save the Evidence Rules project, proposed Article V was scuttled,29 in favor of 
the more general Rules 501 (where substantive federal law applies) and 502 (Erie cases). 
Moreover, the enabling act was amended on the floor of Congress to single out privilege as the 
only area in which the Supreme Court cannot promulgate evidentiary rules without the 
affirmative cooperation of Congress.30 
Yet Fed. R. Evid. 501 permits a court so disposed "in the light of reason and experience" 
to cut back or to destroy privileges traditionally available under the federal common law, so long 
28 E.g., In re Rafsky, 306 B.R. 152 (D. Conn. 2003) (in federal bankruptcy court, federal law regarding marital 
privilege applied). 
29See 120 Congo Rec. 37,084 (1984) (statement of Sen. Taft). 
3°28 U.S.CA. § 2074(b). The enabling act, as initially proposed, had provided generally for the Supreme 
Court's ability to promulgate evidentiary rules and reserved for Congress a veto power. 
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as they are not based in enacted law. Only privileges found to have such a basis, e. g., the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to refuse to testify against oneself and any executive privilege inherent in 
the separation of powers,3! would be immune from such treatment. 
B. Subsequent Changes in the Federal Common Law of Privilege 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 permits case by case balancing and reassessment of social policies in 
deciding whether and to what extent to recognize a new privilege or expand or retrench an 
established one. Hand in hand with Fed. R. Evid. SOl's flexibility, however, come the 
disadvantages of not having codifIed rules that give direction to the courts in the area of 
privilege. 
1. Expansion 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 permits the federal courts to recognize new common law privileges as 
they see fIt. The federal courts' exercise of this power, which would not have existed under 
Proposed Article V, has been most notable with regard to a journalist's privilege32 and a 
psychothera pist-patient privilege.33 
2. Retrenchment 
Proposed Article V would have codified34 the rule of Hawkins v. United States,35 the 
privilege of every criminal defendant to refuse to permit his or her spouse to testify against him 
or her. But, empowered by Rule 501, the Supreme Court did what it could not have done had 
Proposed Article V been adopted. The Court overruled Hawkins in 1980 in Trammel v. United 
States36 and held that the privilege was waivable by the testifYing spouse. 
III. Spousal Privileges 
31See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
32See, e.g., 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 516.2. 
33See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. (1996) (recognizing a federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
See also Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504; Unif. R. Evid. 503 (1999). 
34See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501 and 505. 
35Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
36Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
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The federal common law recognizes two distinct spousal evidentiary privileges: (1) the 
"spousal immunity" or "anti-marital facts" privilege, and (2) the spousal "confidential 
communications" privilege. 
A. The Privilege against "Adverse Spousal Testimony," The "Anti-Marital 
Facts" Privilege, or the "Spousal Immunity" Privilege Not to Testify against 
One's Spouse who is Charged with a Crime 
The "spousal immunity" or "anti-marital facts" privilege applies only as to criminal 
proceedings against one's spouse. It is therefore not applicable in civil tax proceedings in the 
United States Tax Court - at least, by way of analogy to the Fifth Amendment, if there is no 
"reasonable basis for apprehension of the hazards of incrimination." Ryan v. Commissioner, 67 
T.C. 212,217-21 (1976) (Drennan, J.), ajJ'd, 568 F.2d 531, 542-44 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding 
privilege inapplicable for policy reasons in particular civil tax proceeding where spouses had 
been granted use immunity as to any criminal proceedings, but declining to rule that privilege is 
inapplicable in all civil proceedings; court stated that "the privilege should be limited to instances 
in which it makes the most sense, where a spouse used is neither a victim nor a participant 
observes evidence of the other spouse's crime"). 
Nonetheless, the evolution of this privilege both demonstrates the elasticity of the federal 
common law of privilege in light of policy considerations and raises some interesting questions. 
The case law regarding the issues on which courts are divided as to this privilege also may be 
used to inform one's analysis of analogous issues regarding the spousal confidential 
communications privilege. 
1. The Pre-Trammel Common Law Privilege 
At early common law, parties to the case were incompetent to testify, as were the 
parties' spouses. 37 The rationale for the exclusion of the spousal testimony was that the identity 
of interests between the spouses would lead one to commit perjury on behalf of the other. 38 
Later, the general rules of incompetency were abrogated, so that both parties and their spouses 
might testify.39 
But under the subsequent common law rule, a person who was a defendant in a criminal 
case had a privilege to refuse to permit his or her spouse to testify against him or her, and 
37Funk v. United States, 290 U.S, 371, 380-82 (1933), 
38ld. at 381. 
39ld. at 381-87; 2 Wigmore § 602 (rev, 1979). See Brown v, State, 359 Md. 180, 187-202, 753 A.2d 84 (2000) 
(thorough discussion of common law). 
-10-
the spouse being asked to so testify also had a privilege to refuse to do SO.40 The rule applied 
to all of the spouse's possible testimony against the accused spouse, regardless of the source of 
the witness spouse's knowledge of the facts. 
The primary rationale for the common law rule was that the social costs of the destruction 
of marriages that would result from pitting one spouse against the other outweighed the costs of 
the loss of relevant evidence in each case.41 The common law rule did not allow for the 
possibility that, if a spouse was willing to testify against the other, the marriage was beyond 
saVIng. 
It did recognize an exception, however, for crimes against the testifying spouse by the 
accused spouse.42 (In effect, the accused spouse there had forfeited the privilege.) 
3. After Trammel, the Testifying Spouse May Waive this Privilege 
The United States Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Trammel v. United States reversed 
its earlier decisions on the subject. The Court opined that, if a spouse wishes to voluntarily 
testify against the other, the marriage is in such disarray that application of the privilege would 
not be likely to save it. 43 The Court reasoned that in that situation the privilege would serve 
only to hinder the truth-finding process and therefore is unavailable. Trammel illustrates 
the federal courts' ability to perform "a careful balancing of the public's need for disclosure on 
the one hand against the need to protect the marital relationship on the other.44 
40See generally 8 Wigmore §§ 2227, 2241 (rev. 1961). 
41 1d. See Comment, Adverse Spollsal Testimony in Maryland and the Fourth Circuit, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 338 
(1981); 60 N.C. L. REv. 874 (1982). But see 1 Wigmore § 8c at 649 (rev. 1982); 8 Wigmore § 2227-28 (rev. 1961) 
(positing that anti-marital facts privilege may have been based on repugnance to having one spouse responsible for 
other's incarceration, terming the privilege a "most curious and entertaining" "error in the law" and praising 
Bentham's criticism of it); A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, The Husband-
Wife Privilege o/Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 206, 208 (1961); Comment, Questioning the 
Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REV. 307 (1976) (arguing that privilege 
should be available only if showing can be made that real damage will result to the particular marriage involved 
unless privilege is upheld). 
42Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); McCormick §§ 79 & 85; 8 Wigmore § 2239 (rev. 1961). 
43Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). Trammel overruled Hawkins. Unif. R. Evid. 504 (1986), 
infra note 50, codified Trammel. But see Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 725 
(1981 ) (criticizing Trammel). 
441n re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
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Arguably, the Trammel Court did not scrutinize the question of voluntariness very 
closely. It characterized the wife's decision as a voluntary one, even though she had been an 
unindicted coconspirator who had been given use immunity in return for her agreement to 
cooperate with the Drug Enforcement Agency.45 
The result reached in Trammel would not have been possible had Congress adopted 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505. The proposed rule would have retained the adverse spousal 
testimony privilege, as held by-and therefore waivable bY-Dnly the accused spouse.46 
4. The Rule from 1980 to Date 
Under today's federal common law rule then, one spouse may refuse to testify - or 
may agree to testify - against the other spouse47 who is a defendant in the criminal 
proceeding or is the target of a grand jury investigation.48 The privilege applies also to 
45Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (J 980). 
46Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505 provided: 
(a) General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to 
prevent his spouse from testifying against him. 
(b) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the accused or by 
the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. 
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in which one 
spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of either, or 
with a crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the course of 
committing a crime against the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage, or (3) in 
proceedings in which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution or other immoral 
purpose in violation of 8 U.S.c. § 1328, with transporting a female in interstate commerce for 
immoral purposes of other offense in violation of 18 U.S.c. §§ 2421-2424, or with violation of 
other similar statutes. 
See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Committee note. 
47E g., United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335 
(4th Cir. 1993), on remand, 837 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
48 Eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1981); Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276 
(3d Cir. 1980); A.B. v. United States, 24 F.Supp.2d 488, 492-93 (D. Md. 1998) (husband was believed to be drug 
trafficker; wife was given use community and asked about her financial situation and history). See In re Snoonian, 
502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974) (husband could not decline to testify on this ground, when government had agreed not 
to use his testimony or its fruits against his wife); United States v. Premises Known as 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 
71 F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995) (declining to reach question whether privilege applies in quasi-criminal forfeiture 
proceedings, and holding that wife could not invoke this privilege where the forfeiture proceeding was brought 
against her property, and her husband was not a party to the proceeding); United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6th 
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preclude compulsion of a spouse to testify against third persons, when that testimony is relevant 
to their common criminal scheme with the nonwitness spouse, whom the government hopes to 
reach.49 The witness spouse alone holds the privilege and is free to waive it. 
The privilege applies only during the existence of the marriage.50 The party or person 
seeking to invoke the privilege has the burden of proving to the trial judge, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the two spouses are legally married to each other at the 
time of trial. No privilege is available for a common law marriage if the applicable state law 
does not recognize the marriage. 5 I 
The privilege applies only to testimonial evidence52 and precludes only one's 
involuntary testimony as to facts that tend to incriminate one's spouse, not to other 
matters. 53 But it extends to all such information, not just to one's spouse's communications 
and not just to confidential information. 
Ql. Does the "spousal immunity" privilege apply as to events occurring before the 
marriage? If the marriage was entered into just so that the parties could invoke the 
privilege? 
Cir. 1971) (husband, who had been given immunity to testify before grand jury as to gambling conspiracy, could not 
decline to testify on ground that he and his wife had filed joint return and that he could not be compelled to testify 
against his wife; his wife was not being investigated by the grand jury; if somehow his wife were prosecuted, she 
could then object to the introduction of his testimony). 
49In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Mrs. C.O., 22 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D. Md. 1998) (quashing subpoena to wife who 
was asked to testify before grand jury to matters implicating other members of the criminal conspiracy, that would be 
imputed to her husband as a coconspirator). 
50E.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 
951 (9th Cir. 1977) (privilege unavailable after spouses are divorced); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 
(8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (semble); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1975). 
5IE.g., United States v. Rhodes, 569 F.2d 384, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 
747-48 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
52United States v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560,564 (1st Cir. 1979) (privilege does not preclude taking wife's 
fingerprints to help make case against accused husband); In re Grand Jury 85-1,666 F. Supp. 196 (D. Colo. 1987) 
(privilege does not extend to nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints and handwriting), dismissed without 
opinion sub nom. United States v. Shelleda, 848 F.2d 200 (lOth Cir. 1988). 
53 In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 692 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423,430 
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389,396 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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No: See United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (no privilege, because 
marriage three days before trial was fraudulent and spurious); United States v. Van 
Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th Cir. 1974) (following Proposed Rule 505) 
(Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, advisory committee note ("The second exception [Proposed 
Rule 505( c)] renders the privilege inapplicable as to matters occurring prior to the 
marriage. This provision eliminates the possibility of suppressing testimony by marrying 
the witness."»; In re Grand Jury Subpoena off Witness}, 884 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1995) 
(marriage after being served with grand jury subpoena was not a "sham," but marital 
privilege would protect only communications and observations made during, not before, 
marriage). 
Yes: United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476,477 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Byrd,750 
F.2d 585,590 (7th Cir. 1984); A.B. v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 1998); 
United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); State v. Chrismore, 223 
Iowa 957,274 N.W. 3 (1937) (reversible error for prosecution to show that witness had 
married defendant only a few days before trial, so as to imply that he married her to 
suppress her testimony). 
See Hagez v. State, 110 Md. App. 194,211 and n.7, 676 A2d 992 (1996) (setting forth 
authorities pro and con), cert. denied, 359 Md. 669, 755 A2d 1140 (2000). See 
generally, Annot., Existence of spousal privilege where marriage was entered into for 
purpose of barring testimony, 13 AL.R. 4th 1305. 
Q2. Does the spousal immunity privilege apply at all, when the marriage is a "sham" for 
any reason? 
No: Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (privilege inapplicable when marriage 
ceremony was "a sham, phony, [and] empty"). See Brown v. Scafidi, 839 F. Supp. 342 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (neither Pennsylvania's spousal immunity privilege nor its confidential 
communications privilege applies where it would aid in the perpetration of a fraud); 
Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.9.1. 
Q3. Does the spousal immunity privilege apply when the parties are separated and the 
marriage is a shambles at the time of trial? 
Maybe: United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 713 n.2, 715 n.6 (4th Cir. 1993) (trial court reserved 
ruling on whether to permit separated spouse to assert this privilege; trend of cases is to 
"look to the length of the separation as a guide to determining whether the privilege's 
application would promote marital harmony"). 
No: United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1979) (no injury to privilege-
protected values in letting woman, who was with her husband for only two weeks and had 
not seen him for eight months after he had left her, testify against him); United States v. 
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Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (privilege unavailable when marriage was 
"no longer viable"). 
Q4. Should the parties be able to invoke the spousal immunity privilege when they have 
been acting jointly, as partners in crime? 
No: United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Parker, 834 
F.2d 408, 413 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Van Drunen with approval); United States v. 
Clark, 712 F.2d 288, 300-02 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 544 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Van 
Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, l396-97 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974); 
United States v. Freeman, 694 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Va. 1988) (following Seventh Circuit 
cases); Unif. R. Evid. 504(c) (1986) (upon a "prima facie showing"); Unif. R. Evid. 
504( c) (1999) ("an unrefuted showing"). 
Yes: In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated 
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Koecher, 475 U.S. 133 (1986) (no exception); 
Appeal ofMaljitano, 633 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980) (no exception to privilege applies); A.B. 
v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493-94 (D. Md. 1998). 
c:r United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1978) (no error in admitting, against 
husband, wife's taped conversations in furtherance of criminal conspiracy). See also United 
States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (regarding interplay between assertion of 
privilege and severance of trials of husband and wife). 
Q5. "Guess what, Trixie! Ralph just brought home bags of money!" If a spouse makes 
an out-of-court statement against his or her spouse's penal interest, maya third 
party testify to it despite the spousal immunity privilege, as long as the statement 
falls under an exception to the hearsay rule? 
Yes: United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d l326, 1332-33 (lIth Cir. 1989) (prior cases to 
contrary, including Ivey, were inconsistent with Trammel), reh 'g en bane denied, 874 
F.2d821 (lIthCir.1989); UnitedStatesv. Tsinnijinnie,601 F.2d 1035, 1037-39 (9thCir. 
1979); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219,225 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. 
James, 128 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Md. 2001), ajJ'd, 164 F. Supp. 2d 718 (D. Md. 2001) 
(wife's excited utterance was properly admitted; distinguishing United States v. Hall). 
No: Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 
943 (9th Cir. 1963). See United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 715-17 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant by reference to defendant's wife's out-of-
court statements, which were inadmissible hearsay, violated wife's privilege. which she 
had asserted pretrial, not to testifY against her husband). 
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Q6. Maya spouse be compelled to testify in certain situations, such as spousal or child 
abuse? 
Maybe: See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530-31 (1960) (privilege inapplicable 
with regard to alleged Mann Act violation by husband against wife, but court "intimate[d] 
no view on the applicability of the privilege of either a party or a witness similarly 
circumstanced [i. e., marriage occurred after alleged crime] in other situations"). 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505(c) would have both made this privilege inapplicable here and 
also codified Wyatt. Unif. R. Evid. 504(d) (1974) would have disallowed the spousal 
confidential communications privilege in this context. Some state laws would compel a 
spouse's testimony in this situation. Unif. R. Evid. 504(c) (1986) would disallow both 
privileges. Mil. R. Evid. 504(c)(2)(A) precludes the confidential communications 
privilege in the situation of a crime against the other spouse or a child of either spouse. 
United States v. Rollins, 2004 WL 26780 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003); United States v. 
McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003). See generally Imwinkelreid, THE 
NEW WIGMORE § 6.13.5. See also United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(exception to confidential communications privilege). 
Q7. Who is a spouse? 
??: The landscape is changing .... This is an issue sure to arise not only as to privileges but 
also as to joint returns, etc. 
B. Spousal Confidential Communications Privilege 
A person who confides in his or her spouse during their marriage has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose, and to prevent that spouse from testifying to, the content of those 
confidential communications. 54 
1. Scope: Very Different from "Spousal Immunity" Privilege 
As the Tax Court recognized in Ryan, by stating that no claim as to the spousal 
confidential communications privilege was before it,55 the spousal confidential communications 
privilege is distinct from and independent of the "spousal immunity" privilege. The confidential 
54E.g., Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 
(9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979) (dictum). See generally 
Farnham, The Marital Privilege, 18 Litigation No.2 at 34 (Winter 1991); Annot., Marital Privilege under Rule 50 J 
of Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735. 
55 Ryan v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 212, 217 n.3 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951), aff'd, 568 F.2d 531 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
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communications privilege clearly may be raised in civil proceedings56 and regardless whether 
56 £g., SEC v. Lavin, III F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
Compare UnifR.Evid. 504 (1974), which provided for the privilege only in criminal cases. That Uniform 
Rule provided: 
(a) Definition. A communication is confidential if it is made privately by any person to his or her 
spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person. 
(b) General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to prevent his 
spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication between the accused and the spouse. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the accused or by the spouse 
on behalf of the accused. The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed. 
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in a proceeding in which one spouse is 
charged with a crime against the person or property of (I) the other, (2) a child of either, (3) a person 
residing in the household of either, or (4) a third person committed in the course of committing a crime 
against any of them. 
The Uniform Rule was revised in 1986 and 1999. 
Unif. R. Evid. 504 (J 986) reflects the holding of Trammel and includes a broader confidential 
communication privilege. The rule reads: 
(a) Marital communications. An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify or to prevent his or 
her spouse or former spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication made by the individual to 
the spouse during their marriage. The privilege may be waived only by the individual holding the privilege 
or by the holder's guardian, conservator, or personal representative. A communication is confidential if it is 
made privately by an individual to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person. 
(b) Marital facts. The spouse of an accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to refuse to 
testify against the accused spouse. 
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in any civil proceeding in which the spouses 
are adverse parties, in any criminal proceeding in which a prima facie showing is made that the spouses 
acted jointly in the commission of the crime charged, or in any proceeding in which one spouse is charged 
with a crime or tort against the person or property of (I) the other, (ii) a minor child of either, (iii) a person 
residing in the household of either, or (iv) a third person if the crime or tort is committed in the course of 
committing a crime or tort against any of the persons previously named in this sentence. The court may 
refuse to allow invocation of the privilege in any other proceeding if the interests of a minor child of either 
spouse may be adversely affected. 
The Commissioners' Comment to the 1986 Rule explains: 
The previous rule provided for a "marital communication" privilege, as does the new rule. 
However, it is sometimes difficult to determine the boundaries of what constitutes a communication (e.g., 
the spouse who merely is present and sees a crime being committed by the other spouse). Thus, there are 
times when a privilege against testifying ought to obtain with or without the existence of marital 
communication. The new rule reiterates the provision with regard to marital communications. However, a 
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either spouse is a party to the litigation, whenever the testimony sought is that of one 
spouse, as to the other spouse's confidential communication. Although Congress included no 
specific privileges in the version of Fed. R. Evid. 501 that it adopted, Congress made clear that 
new privilege dealing with spousal testimony in a criminal proceeding has been added. This new rule also 
works to permit the testifying spouse to assert the marital communication privilege on behalf of an accused 
spouse, when appropriate, as could be done under the old rule. 
Under the marital communication privilege, the communicating spouse holds the privilege. And, 
the rule is applicable whether or not the communicating spouse is a party to the proceeding. However, this 
privilege is not limited to criminal cases as under the previous rule. It would also apply in civil cases. The 
underlying rationale-that of encouraging or at least not discouraging communications between 
spouses-applies in both types of cases. 
Under the spousal testimony privilege, only the spouse of the accused in a criminal case has a 
privilege to refuse to testify. The rationale-that of not disrupting the marriage--can only be justified in 
criminal proceedings and then there is no basis for giving the privilege to the accused. This provision 
codifies the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 
S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). 
The provision in the previous rule regarding exceptions is also modified. Those exceptions dealt 
with the situation where a spouse is charged with a crime. The new rule extends the exceptions to include 
proceedings where a spouse is accused of a tort. It also creates exceptions where the spouses acted jointly 
in committing a crime, where the spouses are adverse parties, and where the court feels that the interests of 
a child of either should be given preference. There is no privilege in such situations under Rule 504. 
Unif. R. Evid. 504 (1999), which is largely substantively the same as the 1986 Rule, provides: 
(a) Confidential communication. A communication is confidential if it is made privately by an 
individual to the individual's spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person. 
(b) Marital communications. An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and to prevent the 
individual's spouse or former spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication made by the 
individual to the spouse during their marriage. The privilege may be waived only by the individual holding 
the privilege or by the holder's guardian or conservator, or the individual's personal representative if the 
individual is deceased. 
(c) Spousal testimony in criminal proceeding. the spouse of an accused in a criminal proceeding 
has a privilege to refuse to testify against the accused spouse. 
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule: 
(1) in any civil proceeding in which the spouses are adverse parties; 
(2) in any criminal proceeding in which an unrefuted showing is made that the spouses 
acted jointly in the commission of the crime charged; 
(3) in any proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the 
person or property of the other, a minor child of either, an individual residing in the household of either, or 
a third person if the crime or tort is committed in the course of committing a crime or tort against the other 
spouse, a minor child of either spouse, or an individual residing in the household of either spouse; or 
(4) in any other proceeding, in the discretion of the court, if the interests ofa minor child 
of either spouse may be adversely affected by the invocation of the privilege. 
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its intent was to reject the position of Proposed Article V, that would have abolished this 
privilege for marital confidential communications. 57 
Under the majority view, this spousal communications privilege is held alone by the 
spouse who made the confidential communications.58 The privilege may be waived only by its 
holder, although another may assert it in that person's absence, on his or her behalf. 
The stated rationale underlying this privilege is that confidence is essential to the 
husband-wife relationship and that disclosure of marital confidences probably would cause great 
harm to that relationship.59 McCormick argues that the real reason for the privilege is that to 
allow a spouse to disclose the other's confidential communications would offend our feelings of 
decorum by invading marital privacy.6D 
This privilege protects only confidential spousal communications made during the 
marriage,61 while the "spousal communication" privilege protects all information or 
knowledge possessed by a spouse, regardless of its source. 
2. What Qualifies as a "Communication"? 
Generally, however, nonverbal, noncommunicative acts committed in the presence of a 
spouse, even if in reliance on the other's loyalty, are not protected by this privilege, although 
there is some authority to the contrary.62 Communications include verbal communications 
57See 120 Congo Rec. 2391 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman). 
58SEC V. Lavin, 937 F. Supp. 23, 29 (D. D.C. 1996) (the communicating spouse holds the privilege), rev 'd on 
other point, III F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (no waiver by spouses was shown); 8 Wigmore § 2340 (rev. 1961). But 
see Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.5.1 (endorsing minority view that both spouses hold this privilege). 
59E.g., SEC v. Lavin, III F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
6° 1 McCormick § 86. 
61 S.E.c. v. Lavin, III F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (remanding on issue of confidentiality); United States v. Parker, 
834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987) (wife's testimony based on her personal observations, not husband's statements to 
her, did not breach privilege), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th 
Cir. 1977) ("It is well established that this privilege applies only to utterances or expressions intended by one spouse 
to convey a message to the other"; wife's identification of pants as being like her husband's did not violate privilege); 
United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 757 (5th Cir. 1977) (no privilege when spouse's testimony goes only to 
"objective facts"); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (no privilege regarding 
husband's act of hiding drugs in wife's undergarnlent); Annot., 46 A.L.R.Fed. 735 at § 12 (1980). 
62 1 McConnick § 79; 8 Wigmore § 2338 (rev. 1961). See supra note 60. Contra, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 257 
Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165 (1971). But see 35 Cornell L.Q. 187 (1949); 34 Minn.L.Rev. 257 (1950); 36 Iowa 
L.Rev. 154 (1954); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389 (1950) ("communication" within testimonial privilege of confidential 
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(whether oral or written) or nonverbal assertive acts, such as nodding to indicate an affirmative 
or negative response, that are intended as substitutes for particular words. 63 
3. The Requirement of Confidentiality 
Even if a communication between spouses is involved, it is protected by the privilege 
only if it was made in confidence and in reliance on the marital relationship.64 There is a 
presumption of confidentiality,65 but the presumption may be overcome when the nature of the 
communication or other circumstances under which it was made show that it was not intended to 
be confidential. 66 
Husband walks into the house and speaks to Wife, who is in the dining part of the living-
dining area, telling her that he made $1,000 in tips that week. Wife is called to testify on 
behalf of the Government, to Husband's statement, to prove that Husband underreported 
his income. Husband objects on the ground of confidential spousal communications. Does 
that privilege apply: 
Q8. If was made in the presence of their one-year-old son, as Wife was changing his 
diaper? 
Q9. If was made in the presence of their sixteen-year-old son, who was sitting at the 
dining table, doing his homework? 
Q10. If in (9), the son was lying on a sofa in the living area, and was unseen by the 
husband, because the back of the sofa faced the dining area? 
communication between husband and wife includes knowledge derived from observation). Cf 8 Wigmore § 2337 
(rev. 1961) (would protect acts if spouse did something to call them to the other's attention). 
63 See United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (lOth Cir. 1997) (husband's physical act that indicated his desire for 
sexual relations was such a communication). Cf Fed. R. Evid. 80 I (a) for the definition of a statement for purposes 
of the hearsay rule. 
64 1 McCormick § 80. See People v. D'Amato, 105 Misc.2d 1048,430 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1980) (no privilege when 
communications were not made in reliance on relationship but as part of threat against wife, so as to induce her 
loyalty through fear). See generally 41 Tenn.L.Rev. 943 (1976). 
65Blau v. United Sttes, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). 
66Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,14 (1934); United States v. McCollum, 58 MJ. 323 (A.F. C1. Crim. App. 
2003). 
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Marital communications are presumptively confidentia1.67 That presumption is 
defeated in the opponent of the privilege shows that the confider knew that a third person 
was present or other circumstances show that he or she intended no confidentiality.68 
Similarly, disclosure to one's spouse with the intent that the spouse reveal one's 
communication to a third party, outside any other privileged relationship such as 
attorney-client, also will negate the privilege.69 Use of a third party to convey a message 
to one's spouse has been held to make the privilege unavailable, even when that was the 
only possible means for communicating with the spouse. 70 
Ql1. If a roofer (seen by Husband) making repairs heard Husband's statement through 
an open window? May Wife testify over Husband's objection? May the 
roofer/eavesdropper testify? 
Wife may not testify, but the jurisdictions are split on whether a third party who 
eavesdrops on a husband-wife conversation, unbeknownst to the confiding spouse, may 
testify to it. The common law permitted the third party's testimony.71 
The modem trend recognizes the ease with which eavesdropping may now be 
accomplished, e. g., through the use of wiretaps, and allows the confiding spouse to 
invoke the privilege to preclude the third party's testimony.72 The Maryland Court of 
67Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951); Woltle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,14 (1934). 
68E.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,6 (1954); Woltle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,14 (1934); United 
States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1331-32 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 824 (1980). See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 909 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(privilege was applicable when supervisor knew company taped marketers' calls but believed his private telephone 
was not tapped). 
69See 8 Wigmore § 2336 at 651 (rev. 1961). But cf Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538,543--44, 380 A.2d 49, 
53-54 (1977) (husband's asking wife to obtain ring from his apartment was confidential communication, even though 
husband knew wife might require help of third person to gain access to apartment). 
70See Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 516, 204 A.2d 557, 559 (1964) (message sent by prisoner to wife through 
a trusty was not privileged). 
71 8 Wigmore § 2339 at 667 (rev. 1961) (third person may testify). See I McCormick § 82. Cf 8 Wigmore § 
2339 at 668; Annot., Applicability o/marital privilege to written communications between spouses inadvertently 
obtained by third person, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1177 (partially superseded by 51 A.L.R. 5th 603 and 159 A.L.R. Fed. 153 
(federal law». 
72See Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.6.3; I McCormick § 82; 8 Wigmore § 2337 (rev. 1961). 
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Appeals, for example, has held that, in the case of court-authorized wiretaps, privilege 
continues to bar admission of privileged information or its fruit. 73 
Q12. In (10), may the son be compelled to testify? 
73 
Parent-Child Privilege. Numerous attempts have been made to have the courts or 
the legislators74 recognize parent-child privileges corollary to both the "spousal 
immunity" and "spousal confidential communications" privilege. 
Most have been unsuccessfu1.75 But a few lower courts have embraced one or 
both of these privileges.76 Even where some form of parent-child privilege has been 
State v. Mazzone, 336 Md. 379, 390 & nA, 398 & n.8, 648 A.2d 978, 983 & nA, 987 & n.8 (1994). 
74A bill to add a parent-child privilege to the Fed. R. Evid. was introduced in 1999; a similar proposal has been 
made in Massachusetts. Tebo, Parent Privilege, A.B.A. J. 18 (July 2000). 
75E.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 383, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 
1997); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11,16 (2d Cir. 1993) (no parent-child privilege protected mother from testifying against 
adult child); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 896-900 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); 
Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985) (Texas's denial to parents of privilege did not violate their federal 
constitutional rights); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982) (no familial privilege protects 29-
year-old emancipated child from having to testify with regard to business activities before grand jury that was 
investigating his father); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (no federal 
privilege protecting child from having to testify before grand jury investigating parents); United States v. Penn, 647 
F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) ("no judicially or legislatively recognized general 'family' privilege;" in mother's trial, 
no need to suppress drugs which minor child had shown to police in return for promise of five dollars), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 903 (1980); In re Kinoy, 326 F.Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (there is no II 'parent-child privilege;' II 
parent could be compelled to testify about child who was not a target of grand jury investigation but who was sought 
only as a witness with regard to a third party); In re Terry W., 59 CaLApp.3d 745, 130 CaLRptr. 913 (1976) (no 
constitutional parent-child privilege; to recognize one would be contrary to statute); People v. Sanders, 99 IlL2d 
262, 75 IlLDec. 682, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (1983) (holding that presence of minor child when defendant confessed to 
wife destroyed confidential marital communications privilege and refusing, at least under facts, to recognize parent-
child privilege), on remand 127 Ill.App.3d 471, 82 IlLDec. 753,469 N.E.2d 287 (1984); Hunter v. State, 172 
Ind.App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588 (1977) (no parent-child privilege in prosecution of parents for cruelty to child), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977); Cissna v. State, 170 Ind.App. 437, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (J 976) (mother may testify 
against son, because there is no parent-child privilege); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357,455 
N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (1983) (refusing to recognize a privilege protecting minor children from having to testify, as to 
matters that were not confidential communications, before grand jury which was investigating their father with 
regard to murder), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984) (Justice Brennan refused a request to take action to protect the 
children from having to testify. High Court Judge Refuses to Block Children's Testifying in Father's Case, 
Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 23, 1983, at A3, coL 4). Cf United States v. Gray, 71 Fed. Appx. 485, 2003 WL 
21774158 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (adult defendant's statements to his mother, in telephone conversation, 
when wife was present with him and overheard his comments, was not privileged by marital confidential 
communications privilege). 
76In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 949 F.Supp. 1487 (E.D.Wash. 1996) (but, under facts, privilege was not 
applicable); In re Agosto, 553 F.Supp. 1298, 1325 (D.Nev.1983) (child has privilege against being compelled to 
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adopted, the jurisdictions vary as to who holds the privilege - the parent, the child, or 
both? - and whose communications are protected - the child's, the parent's, or both?77 
Q13. If Wife's testimony as to what Husband said, combined with his accompanying 
statement that "the IRS will never know," compellable, as made in the course of an 
ongoing or future crime or fraud? Is there such an exception to the spousal 
communications privilege? 
Both Wigmore and McCormick have criticized the privilege as too inflexible. 
Wigmore would have given the courts discretion with regard to whether it should apply78 
McCormick argued that the privilege should be qualified, not absolute.79 
Q14. If the Government's theory is that both spouses were committing tax fraud, does the 
spousal communications privilege apply if the Government makes a prima facie 
showing that the spouses were "partners in crime"? 
testifY against parent in any criminal proceeding and child also may claim parent-child privilege for confidential 
communications between himself and parent; court relied on constitutional right to certain degree of family privacy). 
See Application of A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978) (protecting confidential communications 
between minor child and parent); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc.2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester Co. Ct. 
1979) (extending privilege to communications made even by children who had reached age of majority). See 
generally Bauer, Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 23 St. Louis U .L.J. 676 (1979); Coburn, 
Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 Dick.L.Rev. 599 (1970); German, 
Family Privilege, Broadened, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983 at 3, col. 1; Luhn, The Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege, 
The Courts, and a Statutory Alternative, 15 U .Balt.L. Forum 12 (Spring 1985); Schlueter, The Parent~'hild 
Privilege: A Response to Calls for Adoption, 19 St. Mary's L.J. 35 (1987); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for 
Confidential Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 Fam.L.Q. 1 (1982); Watts, The Parent-Child 
Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 W. & M.L.Rev. 583 (1987); Comment, The Child-Parent 
Privilege: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 771 (1979); Note, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and 
Family Testimonial Privileges, 20 Ga.L.Rev. 173 (1985); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 
100 Harv.L.Rev. 910 (1987); Note, The Judicial Development of the Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege. Too Big 
jor its Britches?, 26 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 145 (1984); Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child 
Testimonial Privilege, 45 Alb.L.Rev. 142 (1980); Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 
Harv.L.Rev. 1450,1563-92 (1985); 28 S.Tex.L.J. 399 (1986); Comment, 19 Lincoln L.Rev. 123 (1991); Note, 
1990 U .IlI.L.Rev. 879; Annot., Testimonial privilege for confidential communications between relatives other than 
husband and wi/e-state cases, 62 A.L.R.5th 629. 
77Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.2.2 & § 6.5.1 at 555-57. 
78 1 Wigmore § 8c at 649 (rev. 1983). 
79 1 McCormick § 86. 
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The federal courts have been divided on whether confidential communications in 
furtherance of a crime between husband and wife who are criminal conspirators are 
privileged. 80 The trend is toward holding the privilege negated. 81 
80Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1985) (privilege available), vacated & 
remandedfor dismissal on ground ofmootness, 475 U.S. 133 (1986) with United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 
43-44 (1st Cir. 1986) and United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191,194 (7th Cir. 1972) (privilege unavailable), rev'd on 
other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
81United States v. Gray, 71 Fed. Appx. 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished); United States v. Westmoreland, 312 
F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 1790986 (U.S. 2003) ("The initial disclosure of a crime to one's 
spouse, without more, is covered by the marital communications privilege. If the spouse later joins the conspiracy, 
communications from that point certainly should not be protected."); United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408 (4th 
Cir.1987) (exception to privilege extends to all communications between spouses that are in any way related to a 
crime and are made in the course of their joint planning or participation in that crime), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938, 
(1988); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1985) (communications admissible only if they pertain to 
"joint ongoing or future patently illegal activity"); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 364--65 (4th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); Unif. R. Evid. 504(c), supra note _. Judge Hall, writing for the Broome court, 
stated: 
In United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (1978), the Fifth Circuit explicitly recognized the propriety of 
such a finding: 
[This ruling] strikes the proper balance between domestic tranquility and the public interest 
therein, on the one hand, and the revelation of truth and the attainment of justice, which also are in 
the public interest, on the other. Therefore, we hold that conversations between husband and wife 
about crimes in which they are jointly participating when the conversations occur are not marital 
communications for the purpose of the marital privilege, and thus do not fall within the privilege's 
protection of confidential marital communications. 
Id. at 1381. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, and hold that where marital communications have 
to do with the commission of a crime in which both spouses are participants, the conversation does not fall 
within the marital privilege and, consequently, does not limit the applicability of the coconspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
732 F.2d at 365 (footnote omitted). See a/so United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir.1990) (privilege 
inapplicable to present or future crimes involving both spouses); United States v. Cooper, 85 F.Supp.2d I (D.D.C. 
2000) (evidence of spouse's participation in criminal activity, required to overcome marital communications 
privilege, need not be substantial). But see United States v. Premises Known as 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 71 F.3d 
1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1995) ("joint crime exception" applies only if spouse would testify willingly). But cf United 
States v. Foresman, 63 Fed. Appx. 138,2003 WL 21129839 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished) (fact that 
husband asked wife to move an "item" for him did not show that she knew it was an illegal item (an unregistered 
silencer wrapped in a pvc pipe); therefore, error to permit wife to testify to husband's confidential request. 
As to state law in accord with this trend, see State v. Heistand, 708 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Mo. 1986), 
transferred to 714 S.W.2d 842 (Mo.App. 1986). McCormick favors this position. I McCormick § 79 at 298 & n. 
15. Cf Brown v. Scafidi, 839 F.Supp. 342 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (neither Pennsylvania's spousal immunity privilege nor its 
confidential communications privilege applies where it would aid in the perpetration of a fraud). See generally 
Annot., Communications between spouses as to joint participation in crime as within privilege of interspousa/ 
communications, 62 A.L.RAth 1134. Contra, e.g., State v. Mazzone, 336 Md. 379, 384, 392,400-01,648 A.2d 
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Q15. Suppose that Wife wants to testify that she told Husband he had "better be sure to 
report all his tips on their tax return," that he promised he would and that he again 
reassured her that he had done so, when she signed their joint return. May she so 
testify in support of her "innocent spouse" defense? 
I.R.C. § 6015(b)(l)(C)-(D) provides in pertinent part: "(C) the other individual 
filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know, and had 
no reason to know, that there was such understatement; [and] (D) taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other individual liable for the 
deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such understatement. ... " 
Subsection (b )(2) provides in pertinent part: "If an individual establishes that in 
signing the return such individual did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent of 
such understatement. ... " 
Q16. If Wife so testifies, pointing her finger at Husband, may Husband testify to Wife's 
confidential communications to him to the contrary, goading him into not reporting 
the income? 
The privilege is not hers to waive. In a Maryland case, where the privilege is 
statutory82 rather than common law,83 a wife was not allowed to testify to her husband's 
communication to her, even to defend herself against her husband's accusation in his trial 
for murder that she, not he, had committed the murder of his mistress. 84 
But in our hypo, the federal courts have the flexibility of the common law. The 
Supreme Court's willingness to use that flexibility to truncate the spousal privileges is 
exemplified by Trammel. 
978, 980, 984, 988 (1994) (reversible error to admit privileged communications obtained by wiretap); Coleman v. 
State, 281 Md. 538, 545-47, 380 A.2d 49, 54-55 (1977). 
82MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1998 Repl. Vol.) provides: "One spouse is not competent to 
disclose any confidential communication between the spouses during their marriage." 
83Interestingly, although the privilege is often spoken of as having existed as common law, it was statutory in 
England. I McCormick § 78. 
84Srown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 753 A.2d 84 (2000) (accused did not waive confidential marital communications 
privilege by asserting defense that his wife, not he, killed the victim; reversible error to have admitted wife's 
testimony to accused's confession to her that he murdered victim). 
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The wife's liability is on the line in the instant proceeding, and the innocent 
spouse defense was created to aid one in her position. 85 
Additionally, Unif. R. Evid. 504(d)(l) provides that the privilege does not apply 
"in any civil proceeding in which the spouses are adverse parties .... " The Court's 
receptiveness to considering the trend among states is also demonstrated by its decision in 
Jaffee v. Redmoncf6 to adopt a federal common law psychotherapist (licensed psychiatrist, 
psychologist or social worker)-patient privilege. 
The spouses' positions may be adverse, even though they are not technically 
adverse parties. 87 Subsection (d)(3) provides that no privilege applies "in a proceeding 
where one spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the person or property of the 
other. ... " The authors of a respected treatise on federal evidence state: 
By tradition, the privilege is inapplicable (i) in suits by one spouse against 
another, (ii) in a prosecution of one spouse for a crime against the other or 
the children of either, (iii) in suits to recover in tort for alleged damage to 
the marital relation itself, and (iv) in a criminal prosecution of a spouse, 
with respect to communications which that spouse seeks to introduce in 
his or her own defense. 
Though not all of these exceptions have arisen in federal litigation, they are 
fundamentally sound. 88 
If one spouse is permitted to testify, it seems only equitable that the other may do 
so. 
Q17. In our first example, suppose that Wife, excited by her good fortune, throws open 
the sash and calls out to Neighbor, "We're rich! Ralph just told me he made $1,000 
85e! Raymond v. State ex reI. Younkins, 195 Md. 126, 128,72 A.2d 711, 712 (1950) (wife could testify to 
husband's assault on her, because applicable criminal law was designed to protect her). 
86518 U.S. I (1996). 
87 See People v. Foskey, 175 IIl.App.3d 638,125 I1I.Dec. 82, 529 N.E.2d 1158 (1988) (statutory spousal 
confidential communications privilege (letters written by wife to him while he was in jail) must yield to the criminal 
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him so that he could use wife's letters written to him in jail in cross-
examination. See also United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84 (D. Mass. 2003) (in tax fraud prosecution, court 
permitted defendant father to access medical records pertaining to key government witness's mental stability and to 
his perception that father had abused him). Both of these cases were criminal, however, implicating the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right. 
882 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 219 at 908-09 (1985). 
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in tips this week!" In Government's case against Husband Ralph, may Neighbor 
testify to Wife's excited utterance, recounting Husband's admission of a party 
opponent? 
Wife's statement does not appear to have been authorized by Husband. In this 
situation, the cases are divided, although the majority would apply the privilege. 89 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that 
a third person may not testifY to the confided-in spouse's disclosure to that person of his 
or her spouse's confidences, but that opinion was vacated per curiam by the court sitting 
en banc.90 Subsequently that court held that the confidant spouse's out-of-court 
statements as to those communications could not be used to cross-examine the confiding 
spouse. 91 
On the other hand, the privilege applies only to in-court testimony and not to, e.g., 
a tip to the IRS.92 
Q18. Government calls Wife and proffers that she will testify that Husband "never said 
anything to me about any tax shelter" and that (contrary to her husband's 
assertions) she never attended any presentation by a tax shelter promoter. Husband 
objects, citing the spousal confidential communications privilege. 
Q19. In (18), Wife has raised the innocent spouse defense and would testify that when she 
asked Husband what a line on their joint return meant, he said threateningly, "None 
of your business. Shut up and sign it, or 'to the moon, Alice, to the moon! '" 
In (18), is the absence of communication a communication? 
89See Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.6.5. 
90United States v. Thompson, 716 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1983), vacated per curiam, 728 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 
1984) (en banc); United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641-42 (7th Cir. 200 I), reh 'g denied (200 I) (if husband had 
told a third party of his communication to his wife, privilege would have been lost); Annot., Spouse's betrayal or 
connivance as extending marital communications privilege to testimony o/third person, 3 A.L.R. 4th 1104; I 
McConnick § 82; 8 Wigmore § 2339 at 668 (rev. 1961). 
91United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 715-17 (4th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's use of defendant's wife's out-of-court 
statements as basis for cross-examining defendant violated husband's marital communications privilege). 
nSee United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1913, 1318 (9th Cir. 1980) (wife'S statements to police that tax 
records were fraudulent and that some had been moved were not a breach of the confidential communications 
privilege ). 
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In (19), if the confider clearly is not relying on the marital relationship for the 
spouse to maintain the confidence but relies instead, for example, on the threat of 
violence, there is persuasive authority that the privilege should be held to be 
unavailable. 93 Cf LR.C. § 601S(c)(3)(C) (regarding taxpayers who are no longer married, 
or are legally separated, or not living together, relief is granted if "the individual with 
actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed the return under duress"). 
For similar reasons, the privilege may not apply to protect threats made by one 
spouse against the other, or against a spouse's children.94 At least one case has held that 
the privilege does not apply, regarding abuse of any minor child in the household.95 Unif. 
R. Evid. S04( d)(2) and (3) (1999) provide that no privilege applies ("(3) in any 
proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the person or 
property of the other, a minor child of either, an individual residing in the household of 
either, or a third person if the crime or tort is committed in the course of committing a 
crime or tort against the other spouse, a minor child of either spouse, or an individual 
residing in the household of either spouse; or (4) in any other proceeding, in the 
discretion of the court, if the interests of a minor child of either spouse may be adversely 
affected by the invocation of the privilege"). 
Q20. If the spousal communications privilege is properly invoked, may the court draw an 
adverse inference against the confider? 
Most federal courts agree that there may be no adverse comment on or inference 
from a criminal defendant's or a criminal defendant's spouse's exercise of a husband-wife 
pri vilege. 96 
93People v. D'Amato, 105 Misc.2d 1048,430 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1980). 
94United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Section 2013 ofH.R. 5269, part of which became the Crime Control Act of 1990, P.L. 101-647, would 
have added a new Fed. R. Evid. 502, to provide that the privilege for confidential communications does not apply in 
any criminal action or proceeding involving the abuse, neglect, or sexual exploitation of a child under the age of 
eighteen, but S. 3266 struck the proposed Rule. 
95United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (spousal confidential communications privilege 
encompasses husband's physical act that indicates his desire for sexual relations, but exception applies in a case 
regarding abuse ofa minor child in the household). 
96Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); United States v. Golding, 168 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(reversible error; prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1993) (reversible 
error to permit prosecutor to prove on cross-examination of defendant's wife that she had invoked spousal privilege 
before grand jury), on remand, 837 F.Supp. 726 (E.D.Va. 1993); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 
1039-40 (9th Cir. 1979) (no error, however, in instructing jury that accused had invoked his privilege not to have 
wife testifY, when defense attorney had implied that prosecution had not called her because her testimony would have 
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But differing approaches have emerged among the federal courts with regard to 
whether comment on the exercise of privileges in non-criminal proceedings is proper. 
The case law permits an inference to be drawn in a civil case from the invocation of one's 
privilege against self-incrimination,97 but is not developed as to other privileges.98 The 
been exculpatory), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 52 I F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1975). 
See United States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039, 1042 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (no adverse inference could be drawn against 
accused due to failure of his wife to testify, absent showing that her testimony was peculiarly in his power to 
produce, when she held privilege not to testify). Contra Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 721--22 (9th Cir. 
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962). But see United States v. Hopkins, 169 F.Supp. 187, 195 (D.Md. 1958) 
(where defense did not call accused's wife, although she was present in court, court would infer that her testimony 
would not have helped defense). 
97 E.g Baxter v. Palmingiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (1976) (HOur conclusion [that an adverse 
inference may be drawn against a state prison inmate from his silence in disciplinary proceedings] is consistent with 
the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when 
they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the 
inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.' H), on remand, 536 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1976); id 
at 334 (HI would have difficulty holding such an inference impermissible in civil cases involving only private 
parties. H) (Brennan, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Currie Enterprises, 142 
F.R.D. 8,13 (D.Mass. 1991); Sherrer v. Comm'r, T.e. Memo 1999-122 at 42-43,1999 Tax. Ct. Memo LEXIS 108, 
77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1795, T.e.M. (RIA) 99122 (1999). See Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006,1011-12 (4th Cir.1989) 
(no abuse of discretion in refusing to shield civil RICO defendant from facing the alternatives of either not testifying, 
or facing questions regarding a pending criminal investigation and invoking the fifth amendment in the presence of 
the jury); Rosebud Sioux Nation v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1984) (under circumstances, proper for 
party to have called witness, knowing he would invoke Fifth Amendment privilege), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1072 
(1984); Brinks, Inc. v. New York, 717 F.2d 700, 707-10 (2d Cir.1983) (semble). Cj Mammoth Oil Co. v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 13, 52 (1927) (in civil suit, HWhile [principal of defendant's] failure to testify cannot properly be 
held to supply any fact not reasonably supported by the substantive evidence in the case, it justly may be inferred that 
he was not in a position to combat or explain away any fact or circumstance so supported by evidence and material to 
the Government's case. H) (citation omitted); Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Surety Co., 936 F.2d 
1364, 1374 (I st Cir.1991) (in civil case, individual's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be used to 
draw an inference against corporate party). See generally I McCormick § 121; 2 Weinstein ~~ 513.0 1-513.04; 
Moxham, A Comment upon the Effect of Exercise of One's Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Litigation, 12 New 
Eng.L.Rev. 265 (1976); Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 
Minn.L.Rev. 383 (1977). 
Regarding the propriety of dismissing a suit when the plaintiff asserts the privilege, see Campbell v. 
Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979); Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), on 
petition for rehearing per curiam 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980). 
98See United States v. Premises Known as 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 71 F.3d 1067, 1071 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(declining to reach question whether adverse inference from invocation of spousal privileges would be permissible in 
civil proceedings); In re Tudor Assocs., Ltd., II v. Rulisa Operating Co., 20 F.3d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1994) (negative 
inference should not be drawn from proper invocation of attorney-client privilege); United States v. Jackson, 384 
F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1967) (adverse inference impennissible from infonner's privilege), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 
(1968); Mueller & Kirkpatrick § 180 (arguing that inference should not be pennitted); Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 906 
(1970) (effect of comment by counsel as to refusal to penn it introduction of privileged testimony). 
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inference, however, cannot constitute the sole basis for the judgment against the invoker, 
even in a civil case.99 
Both proposed Fed. R. Evid. 513, which was not enacted, and Unif. R. Evid. 511 
provide that no comment or inference would be permitted from the claim of any 
privilege. 100 
Q21. The marriage has been dissolved through divorce. Does the confidential 
communications privilege still apply as to communications that were made during 
the marriage? To communications that were made during the period of legal 
separation? 
In order for confidential communications to be privileged, they must have been 
made during the existence 10l of a valid marriage. 102 If so made, they generally are 
protected by the privilege even after the termination of the marriage by divorce or 
99Sherrer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1999-122 at 42-43 (taking petitioner's silence into account, along with all the 
other evidence of fraud) (Beghe, J.). See Kramer v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 575, 585-87, 558 A.2d 760, 765-66 (1989) 
(quoting with approval from sources which state, inter alia, that invocation of the privilege cannot constitute the sole 
basis for the judgment against the invoker, even in a civil case); I McCormick § 74.1 at 277. 
100Proposed FRE 513 provided: 
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present 
proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference 
may be drawn therefrom. 
* * * 
Unif. R. Evid. 511 (1999) is substantially identical to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 513. 
IOIE.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. I (1954) (communications before marriage not privileged); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witness J, 884 F.Supp. 188 (D.Md. 1995) (marriage after being served with grand jury 
subpoena was not a "sham," but marital privilege would protect only communications and observations made during, 
not before marriage). 
I02United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995) (defendant failed to prove valid marriage); 
United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977) (no privilege regarding testimony by defendant's 
common law wife, because marriage invalid under applicable state law), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978). 
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death. 103 Should a distinction be made between marriages that ended in divorce or were 
terminated by death? 
There is substantial authority that communications made after the marriage is "on 
the rocks," but before it is terminated, are not privileged. 104 Military R. Evid. 504(b)(1) 
makes communications unprotected if they were made while the spouses were legally 
separated. Presumably at this point the confider is aware of the risk that the two are not 
"on the same page." Therefore, ifWigmore's "instrumental" approach to privileges is 
followed, the parties may need the privilege more than ever in the course of trying to 
repair their marriage. 105 
Q22. Suppose Husband had said nothing, but Wife saw him moving bags of cash around 
the garage. (i) May Wife tell the F.B.I.? (ii) May she testify? 
(i) Yes. 106 
103 E.g., Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (I 897) (common law rule of incompetency remains in effect after 
death of confiding spouse); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. I, 6 (1954) (privilege survived divorce but was 
inapplicable for other reasons); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839) (privilege survives spouse's 
death); United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (privilege survives divorce); United States v. 
Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 436 (D.C.Cir. 1972) (privilege survived spouse's death but was inapplicable for other reasons). 
See 8 Wigmore § 234 I (rev. 196 I); I McConnick §§ 8 I, 85. 
I04United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1301 (I Ith Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (marital communications 
privilege inapplicable to communication made when couple was pennanently separated; in detennining whether 
pennanent separation has OCCUlTed, "A district court should focus upon the following three objective factors as 
especially important: (I) Was the couple cohabiting?; (2) if they were not cohabiting, how long had they been living 
apart'); and (3) had either spouse filed for divorce?"); United States v. Jackson, 939 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991) (no 
confidential communications privilege for communications made after the couple has pennanently separated); 
United States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) (marital privilege was properly held inapplicable when an 
action for dissolution of the marriage had been filed two months prior to the communication, the defendant was no 
longer living with his wife at the time of the communication, and wife testified that marriage had failed prior to the 
communication); United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987) (marital communications privilege 
inapplicable to communications made when spouses are pennanently separated); In re Witness Before the Grand 
Jury, 79 I F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1986) (no confidential communication privilege when spouses are estranged). See 
Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469,87 A. 40,43-44 (1913); McEntire v. McEntire, 107 Ohio St. 510,140 
N.E. 328 (1923); People v. D'Amato, 105 Misc.2d 1048,430 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (1980) (privilege unavailable when 
parties had separated numerous times and marriage was "in utter shambles"). See Gardner, A Re-Evaluation a/the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, Pt. 2, 8 Vill.L.Rev. 447, 490 (1963) (arguing that court should have power to allow 
disclosure of confidential communications, upon showing of good cause, after marriage is over). Contra Coleman v. 
State, 281 Md. 538, 544, 380 A.2d 49,53 (I 977). See McConnick § 8 I. 
I05See Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.9.1 (discussing split of authority, as well as difference in results 
under instrumental and humanistic models). 
I06See United States v. Foresman, 63 Fed. Appx. 13,2003 WL 21 129839 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(unpublished). See also note 42 supra. 
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(ii) Yes. 107 
Q23. Suppose Husband was in jail and asked a prison trusty to take a note to Wife. 
Privilege? 
Generally, no.108 
IV. Attorney-Client Privilege 
Although not enacted, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503 sets out the general framework of the 
common law attorney-client privilege recognized in the federal courtS. 109 Proposed Rule 503 
provides: 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(l) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or 
other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional 
legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining 
professional legal services from him. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client 
to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in 
the rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1) 
between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) 
between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a 
107 See United States v. Foresman, 63 Fed. Appx. 13,2003 WL 21129839 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(unpublished). See Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE §§ 6.7.1 & 6.7.3. See also notes 53-55 supra. 
I08See Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.10.1. 
I09See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (applying the privilege to coproate client). 
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lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4) between 
representatives of the client or between the client and representative of the client, or (5) 
between lawyers representing the client. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his 
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, 
trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the 
communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to 
do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule: 
(l) Furtherance 0.[ crime or .fraud. If the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the 
client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, 
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter 
vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; 
or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an 
issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; 
or 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common 
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of 
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action 
between any of the clients. 
With modern technology, an attorney-client relationship may possibly be formed even by an 
attorney's giving legal advice in an online "chat room."IIO 
IIOD.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee Opinion No. 316 (Sept. 2002), www.dcbar.orgiforJawyers/ethics/ 
legal_ ethics/opinions/opinion316.cfm (cited in Barber, Chat Room Advice May Create Attorney-Client Relationship, 
28 Litigation News 12 (No.4, May 2003)). See also Maher, Uncertain Duty.' Prospective Clients' E-Mail Queries 
May Not Be Entitled to Confidentiality, 89 A.B.A.J. 38 (June 2003). 
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Some interesting and difficult questions continue as to when a client's identity might be 
privileged; who may properly be considered an agent of the lawyer (or an agent of the client) for 
purposes of the attorney-client privilege; waiver of the privilege by inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged materials; sufficiency of a corporate client's privilege log; and to what extent 
government officials enjoy the privilege as clients. 
A. Who Qualifies as an Attorney's Agent 
Confidential communications between the client and the lawyer, or a person employed by 
the lawyer to aid in the provision of legal services, will be covered by the privilege. But 
communications with such persons who are not providing that type of assistance will not fall 
within the attorney-client privilege. This line is not facilely drawn. 
An attorneys' secretary, clerk, etc., will be covered. III But when an attorney hires 
non-legal experts to aid the attorney, a more difficult question arises. If the expert, such as a 
psychiatrist, is hired by the lawyer to talk confidentially with the client, or to study the client's 
confidential communications to the lawyer, so as to assist the attorney in providing legal services, 
the communications among expert, client, and lawyer will be privileged. I 12 
IIISee Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D.Md. 1974) (while attorney-client privilege extends 
to the agents and immediate subordinates of the attorney, such as the attorney's secretary, who are essential to the 
attorney's performance oflegal services, it "was not intended to permit the attorney to dub all persons with whom he 
has contact as his agents, thereby cloaking all such communications with protection"). 
112E g., United States v. Salamanca, 244 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.S.D. 2003) (privilege applies as to court-appointed 
interpreter for defendant, who was a necessary component of defendant's communications with his attorney; 
interpreter could not testify as expert for government); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 
947 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir.1991 ) (communications between client and accountant en route to and at meeting with 
attorney, when client intended to hire attorney, were privileged, even though client never hired attorney; prior 
communications between client and accountant were not privileged); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 
1045-46 (3d Cir.1975) (psychiatrist); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.1961) (accountant, under 
circumstances similar to In re Grand Jury); Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.e. 677,686 (1995) (appraiser assisting 
lawyer in providing legal advice). See United States v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270, 275-76 (e.M.A. 1987) 
(psychotherapist), reajJ'd on rehearing, 26 M.J. 104 (C.M.A. 1988). 
As the advisory committee note explains: 
The definition of "representative of the lawyer" recognizes that the lawyer may, in rendering legal 
services, utilize the services of assistants in addition to those employed in the process of communicating. 
Thus the definition includes an expert employed to assist in rendering legal advice. United States v. Kovel, 
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant). Cf Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949). 
It also includes an expert employed to assist in the planning and conduct of litigation, though not one 
employed to testify as a witness. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 
1898), and see revised Civil Rule 26(b)( 4). The definition does not, however, limit "representative of the 
lawyer" to experts. Whether his compensation is derived immediately from the lawyer or the client is not 
material. 
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When an accountant was hired for his tax advice alone, to advise client's lawyers, rather 
than to improve communications with the client, communications between the accountant's and 
client were not privileged. J J3 
On the other hand, communications between the attorney and third parties whom the 
lawyer has employed to perfonn objective tasks without needing to analyze the client's 
communications will not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, nor will third persons 
providing only nonlegal advice. 114 They may receive some protection, however, under the 
attorney work product doctrine. Communications with third parties consulted by the client, not 
hired by the attorney, would not be protected under either privilege. 
The cases regarding communications with a public relations firm hired by the attorney to 
represent the client as to a legal matter are divided. 115 
B. What Qualifies as Legal Advice? 
The attorney-client privilege applies only when legal advice or legal services are 
sought. 116 Business advice, for example, is not privileged. I 17 
l13 In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003). 
114Sut see Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1 st Cir. 2002) (documents created by or disclosed to 
accountants, with regard to meeting with client and attorney, were not protected by attorney-client privilege, when 
accountants provided only accounting advice and were not hired to assist attorneys in providing legal advice); 
Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.e. 677,686 (1995) (accountant). 
115Compare Federal Trade Comm'n v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.e. Cif. 2002) (citations 
omitted) ("Our conclusion that the documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege extends 
also to those communications that GSK shared with its public relations and government atlairs 
consultants. The Kinzig affidavit notes that GSK's corporate counsel 'worked with these 
consultants in the same manner as they did with full-time employees; indeed, the consultants 
acted as part of a team with full-time employees regarding their particular assignments' and, as a 
result, the consultants 'became integral members of the team assigned to deal with issues [that] ... 
were completely intertwined with [GSK's] litigation and legal strategies.' In these circumstances, 
'there is no reason to distinguish between a person on the corporation's payroll and a consultant 
hired by the corporation if each acts for the corporation and possesses the information needed by 
attorneys in rendering legal advice. "') with Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 
(S.D.N.Y.2000). 
116 Eg, Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 2003 WL 22077466 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (memoranda not prepared in 
response to any client's specific request for legal advice, but were educational materials intended to lure new clients 
to sell them tax strategies, were not protected by attorney-client privilege). See Proposed FRE 503, advisory 
committee note ("The services must be professional legal services; purely business or personal matters do not 
qualify. ") (citing McCormick); In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 60 1-05 (4th Cir.1997) (attorney was hired to do 
investigative work in her capacity as an attorney); In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626-28 (7th Cir.1988) (entrusting 
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Where tax advice falls may be a challenging question. I 18 The new tax practitioner 
privilege, I.R.C. § 7525, applies only when communications made after July 22, 1998 would 
have been privileged under the attorney-client privilege (not attorney work product) if the 
preparer had been an attorney, 119 i. e., when they are pertinent to "legal advice." Mere preparation 
of a tax return does not qualify as the provision of "legal services"; accompanying worksheets are 
as unprivileged in the hands of a lawyer as in the hands of an accountant. 120 That fact does not 
change even if the documents are "dual purpose" documents that are also relevant to 
documents to a lawyer rather than to a file clerk did not make privileged communications dealing only with 
mechanically searching corporate records files); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.1986) (using 
attorneys as mere conduits for payments offunds did not qualify as seeking legal advice), footnote corrected 817 
F.2d 64 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441-43 (4th Cir.1986) (privilege inapplicable 
when defendant spoke to colleague as a friend rather than as a legal advisor), cert. denied 480 U.S. 938, 107 S.Ct. 
1585,94 L.Ed.2d 775 (1987); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir.1980) (no privilege when 
attorney performs only ministerial or clerical privileges or acts as business agent; no privilege when attorney merely 
oversaw sale of equipment), cert. denied 451 U.S. 975, 10 I S.Ct. 2058, 68 L.Ed.2d 356 (1981); Diversified Indus. 
v. Meredith, on reh'g en banc 572 F.2d 606,610 (8th Cir.1978) (rejecting panel's finding, at 572 F.2d 596, 602-03 
(8th Cir.1977), that no privilege existed regarding reports of attorney's investigation and recommendations, on theory 
that non-lawyers could have performed same services); F.e. Cycles In!'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 
71-72 (D.Md. 1998) (part of documents relating only to business advice was not privileged, but parts relating to legal 
advice were privileged). 
117 See Clinton Pardon Files Ordered Given to Jury, The Baltimore Sun, 6A, col. 6 (Dec. 14,200 I) (New York 
federal judge ordered Marc Rich's attorneys to tum over their files, as "The Marc Rich lawyers were acting 
principally as lobbyists, working with public relations specialists and individuals-foreign government officials, 
prominent citizens and personal friends of the president-who had access to the White House. They were not acting 
as lawyers or providing legal advice in the traditional sense."). 
118United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391,412 n.15, 57 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 429 (4th Cir. 200 I), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 935, & cert. denied, 535 U.S. 989 (2002). See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 
1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he privilege is triggered only by a client's request for legal, as 
contrasted with business, advice." "Tax advice rendered by an attorney is legal advice within the ambit of the 
privilege."); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, I 072-73 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (doubtful that there was a 
privilege with regard to communications with attorneys hired primarily to write tax opinions to be used in 
commercial brochures promoting tax shelters, not to guide clients themselves, but assuming there was privilege, it 
was waived); United States V. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981), reh 'd denied, 645 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 
1981); Marshall V. Hendricks, 103 F. Supp. 2d 749, 786 (N.DJ. 2000), afl'd in part & rev 'd in part on other 
grounds, 307 F.3d 36 (3d Cir. 2002); United States V. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1983); Orkin, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege in Tax Maners, 49 A.B.A. J. 794 (1963); Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal 
Revenue Service Investigations, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 67 (1969). 
11926 U .S.e. § 7525(a)(1). The new "tax practitioner" privilege applies only in either a "noncriminal tax matter 
before the Internal Revenue Service" or "any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the 
United States." Id. § 7525(a)(2)(A) & (B). See United States V. BDO Seidman, LLP, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003); 
United States V. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 CD.D.e. 2002). It is inapplicable in other civil proceedings and in 
any criminal proceeding. 
120 Eg., United States V. Frederick, 99-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) ~ 56,465 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (preparer was both 
an accountant and clients' lawyer). 
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contemplated or pending litigation: they are not protected by the work product doctrine either. 
Although a lawyer's cover construing statutory or case law in preparation for representation of a 
client during an audit could be so protected. 121 
C. Identity of Client 
Because the attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications, 122 
generally it is held not to protect such facts as the client's identity, the fact that the client hired the 
attorney, and that the client paid a fee.123 Those parts of bills that contain privileged information, 
regarding the nature of the legal work performed, however, will be properly redacted. 124 
122 E.g., Kanne v. Comm'r, 73 T.C 1163 (1980), afJ'd, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982) (system accountings not 
protected). 
123 E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2000) (client's identity is not privileged); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 353-54 (4th Cir. 1994); Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1426-29 (9th Cir. 
1988). See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (II Wheat.) 280, 294-95 (1826) (possibly, attorney might properly be 
asked whether he or she had been retained by a person in a matter, but not as to cl ient's title, claim, or defense); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039 (II th Cir. 1990) (affinning contempt order against attorney 
who refused to testify before a grand jury as to client's identity and to attorney's receipt of fees); United States v. 
Flores, 628 F.2d 521,526 (9th Cir. 1980) (referring to "the long established proposition that the identity of the client 
is not a confidential communication"); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 110 I, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1976) (payment 
and amount of fees not privileged), ajJ'd in part & vacated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); United 
States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (2203) (Martha Stewart waived privilege by sending her daughter a copy of 
an e-mail she had sent to her attorney); UnitedStatesv. Grand Jury Matter, 789 F.Supp. 693 (D. Md. 1992) (privilege 
inapplicable: attorney failed to show that government's attempt to obtain, by subpoena, fee arrangement 
infonnation-regarding dates and amounts of payments and identity of persons making them-would violate 
privilege); In re Grand Jury Subpoena c/d 91 R0052-11, 142 F.R.D. 122 (M.D.nC 1992) (denying attorneys' 
motions to quash subpoenas directed at their records regarding fees from certain clients, but granting one attorney's 
motion in part, as to documents that reveal fee-payer-client's payment of other person's fees, which are integral to 
fee-payer's confidential communication of his involvement with drug conspiracy); Payden v. United States, 605 
F.Supp. 839, 846-47 (S.D.N.V. 1985) (attorney must disclose to grand jury fees he has received from client indicted 
for selling drugs; if fees are from illegal source, government may confiscate them), rev 'd on other grounds, 767 
F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), subsequent proceeding, 775 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Osborn, 409 F.Supp. 406, 
411 (D.Or. 1975) (fees charged and general nature oflegal services provided are not privileged, but more specific 
descriptions of services provided are privileged), ajJ'd in part & rev 'd in part, 561 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977). But 
see In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (I st Cir. 1984) (no abuse of discretion in quashing subpoenas directed at 
obtaining attorney fee records). See generally Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE § 6.7.2 (interesting discussion of, 
inter alia, 28 U.S.C § 60501) (copy of § 6.7.2 is attached to this handout). 
1 24Chaudhry v. Callerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 215 181 (U.S. 1999); 
Brennan v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D. 660 (D.S.D. 2001) ("In a legal bill, 'the identity of the client, the 
amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file name, and the general purpose of the work performed 
are usually not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.' Clarke v. American Commerce Nat. 
Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992). On the other hand, billing statements 'which also reveal the motive of the 
client in seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the services perfonned, such as 
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But several cases have held a client's identity privileged when "the person invoking the 
privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would 
implicate that client in the very [past] criminal activity for which legal advice was sought," 125 i.e., 
it would disclose those clients' confidences. 126 This approach has not been universally endorsed, 
however. 127 
No privilege will apply, of course, unless legal services are sought or performed by the 
attorney; a lawyer's acting merely as a courier or a scrivener will not suffice. 128 
researching particular areas of the law, fall within the privilege."'). But see Valenti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 
F.Supp.2d 200, 217-220 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (defendant's claims of privileges as to various words in billing statement 
"perplexing" and unreasonable). 
125Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663,666 (7th Cir.1965). Accord In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1,676 
F.2d 1005, 1008-09, 1011 (4th Cir.1982) ("Payment of fees and expenses generally is not privileged information 
because such payments ordinarily are not communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. An 
exception to the no privilege rule is recognized 'where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong 
probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very [past] criminal activity 
for which legal advice was sought.' *** [Therefore, u]ntil the government discloses the relevance of the subpoenaed 
documents to the grand jury's investigation, proper ruling on the privilege issue cannot be made." "When a grand 
jury subpoena undermines an ongoing attorney-client relationship [between the target of the grand jury investigation 
and his or her counsel], the United States attorney should [not only show that the subpoena is regular but] also show 
by affidavit an important need for the information sought. ") (citations and footnote omitted), opinion vacated, 697 
F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215,218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodge 
& Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975), reh 'g 
denied, 521 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1975); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (applying California law). 
See Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law; privilege inapplicable when 
no showing that disclosure of identity would lead to disclosure of client's confidences). Cj: In re Grand Jury 
Empanelled, Feb. 14, 1978,603 F.2d 469 Od Cir. 1979) (client's identity not privileged, but attorney could invoke 
Fifth Amendment privilege). 
126See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 FJd 516 (4th Cir.2000) (client's identity is within the attorney-client 
privilege only when the client has not authorized the disclosure of confidential information or of a confidential 
communication, and the compel\ed disclosure of client's identity is tantamount to revealing his or her confidences; 
those circumstances were not met here); United States v. Braun, 2003 WL 21791231 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (privilege 
applied where attorney who had been hired to pay second attorney to represent client's apparent co-conspirator 
presented affidavit that her client had consulted him regarding legal advice potentially related to conduct for which 
apparent coconspirator was being investigated; crime-fraud exception not applicable where insufficient proof of 
agreement to further conspiracy in such a way). 
127Gannet v. First Nat'l St. Bank, 410 F.Supp. 585 (D.N.J. 1976) (attorney, in whose trust account cashier's 
checks were deposited by client for payment of back taxes, may be required to disclose client's identity), aff d in part 
& rev 'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. First Nat'l St. Bank, 540 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.I976), affd, 
546 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). 
128See In re Keeper of the Records v. United States, 348 FJd 16 (1st Cir. 2003); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 
626 (9th Cir. 1960) (apparently, counsel gave clients legal advice to pay taxes). 
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D. Client List Disclosure Cases 
Client lists are sought in tax shelter abuse cases such as United States v. KP MG LLP. 129 
A trio of conflicting opinions issued between June 24 and July 23,2003 is informative. 
1. Doe v. WacllOvia Corp. 
In the first, Doe v. Wachovia Corp., the United States District Court for the Western 
District of North Carolina, the IRS sought investor lists, from a bank, with regard to potentially 
abusive tax shelters as defined by 26 C.F.R. § 301.6112-11. The bank was required by that 
regulation to maintain such lists. 
Clients of the bank sought to enjoin the bank from complying with the IRS summons. 
The clients alleged that they received legal advice from a law firm (1&0), accounting advice 
from KPMO, and that the bank "facilitat[ed] and implement[ed] tax advice concerning 
investment strategies.,,130 The clients relied on § 7525. 
The letter of engagement between the clients and the bank made clear, in so many words, 
that the bank was not providing legal advice. The agreement between the clients and the law 
firm referred not to confidences by the clients, but required the clients to keep confidential the 
law firm's "confidential proprietary information [regarding] certain financing structures ... 
developed by" the law firm. 131 The agreement disavowed any agency or fiduciary relationship 
between the law firm and the clients. The court found that no attorney-client relationship existed. 
The court quoted with approval IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams' June 6, 2002 speech on 
similar arrangements. 132 
It therefore did not reach the question whether the clients' identities would have been 
protected, had there been such a relationship. 133 
The court further concluded that there was no fiduciary or agency relationship between 
the taxpayers and the bank. 134 
179 
- 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (0.0.c. 2002). 
13000e v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (W.O.N.C. 2003). 
13 I !d. at 631. 
132Id. at 635 (citing 70 Prac. Tax Strategies 324, 328-32 (June 2003». 
133Id. at 632. 
134Id. at 636. 
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It found § 7525 inapplicable for several reasons, including (1) by virtue of § 7525(b), on 
the ground that the transaction required the participation of a corporation in promotion of a tax 
shelter; and (2) that the issuance of an IRS summons to the bank was not a "tax proceeding" 
before the IRS, nor was the instant proceeding one "brought by or against the United States.,,135 
Additionally, the court found, relying on United States v. KPMG KPMG had not provided __ 
tax advice, but only accounting advice.136 Even if it had provided tax advice, the IRS was 
seeking the clients' identities from the bank, not from the tax preparer. 137 Injunctive relief was 
denied. 
2. United States v. Arthur Andersen 
In United States v. Arthur Andersen, 138 the United States sought to enforce nineteen IRS 
summonses against the accounting firm Arthur Andersen. The accounting firm notified the 
investors of the subsequent court order to supply the information, and two groups of investors 
intervened under fictitious names. The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois granted relief to the intervenors on the ground that their identities were protected under 
§ 7525. 
The court found that the United States, by seeking to investigate Andersen as a promoter 
of tax shelters, had shot itself in the foot: 
[I]n the current matter it is Petitioner itself that has fixed Andersen's 
capacity as tax advisor and not as tax preparer. Petitioner is seeking to obtain 
documents relating to Andersen's activities as a promoter of tax shelters, an 
activity that necessarily involves dispensing tax advice to potential investors. 
While it is certainly true that the Does' and the Poes' tax returns were likely 
impacted by the advice that they received, whether and how Andersen prepared 
those returns is irrelevant for the purposes of Petitioner's investigation and has no 
bearing on their motivations in seeking Andersen's advice on the tax shelters. 
Given this fact, and the very nature of Petitioner's investigation, we cannot say 
that the Does and the Poes have failed to meet their burden; in fact, Petitioner has 
met it for them. 139 
1351d. at 637. 
1 361d. 
i371d. at 638. 
138273 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
1391d. at 960 nA. 
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The regulation requiring the maintenance of the investor list was of no assistance to the IRS, 
because § 301.61112-IT Q&A 17(b) (2000) provides: 
in any case in which an organizer or a seller of a potentially abusive tax shelter 
believes that information required to be maintained as part of the list for that tax 
shelter ... constitutes confidential tax advice protected under Section 7525(a), 
such information may be withheld from the Service. 140 
The fact that the IRS suspected Andersen of fraud did not prove that fraud; nor did it 
make the crime-fraud exception applicable as to the investors. 141 The client's identities were held 
to be protected, on the ground that revealing them would "perforce [reveal] a confidential 
communication .... " 142 
The continued viability of this conclusion is placed in doubt by the United States Court of 
Appeals' subsequent holding in a similar case. 
3. United States v. RDO Seidman 
The Seventh Circuit issued an opinion three weeks later in United States v. BDO 
Seidman,143 a similar case, the earlier opinions as to which the Andersen court had relied. In 
BDO Seidman, the IRS sought enforcement of twenty summonses against accounting firm BOO 
Seidman ("BOO"), which it suspected of failing to keep required records of shelters. Several of 
BOO's clients sought to intervene, to protect their identities, relying on § 7525. the district court 
had denied the motion, and the court of appeals had remanded for in camera inspection of the 
documents at issue. 
On remand, the district court concluded that the clients had not met their burden of 
making a colorable claim of privilege by proving that they sought legal advice from BOO. As to 
some, no documents had been provided for review. As to the others, many of the confidentiality 
agreements between them and BOO established that they hired BOO, in part, to prepare income 
tax returns. Some agreements explicitly stated that BOO provided no "'legal and/or tax 
opinions. '" 144 
1401d. at 960. 
141 1d. at 961. 
142 Id. at 959. 
143337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), reh 'g & reh 'g en bane denied. 
144Id. at 807. 
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the clients' motion to 
intervene. In an opinion by Judge Ripple, the Seventh Circuit found that clients' identities are in 
any event not privileged, except "in the rare circumstance when so much of an actual confidential 
communication has been disclosed already that merely identifying the client will effectively 
disclose that communication.,,145 That exception was inapplicable here: 
Disclosure of the identities of the Does will disclose to the IRS that the 
Does participated in one of the 20 types of tax shelters described in its 
summonses. It is less than clear, however, as to what motive, or other confidential 
communication of tax advice, can be inferred from that information alone. 
Compared to the situations in the Tillotson and Cherney cases, where the 
Government already knew much about the substance of the communications 
between the attorney and his unidentified client, in this case the IRS knows 
relatively little about the interactions between BDO and the Does, the nature of 
their relationship, or the substance of their conversations. 146 
The court also reasoned that, "[M]ore fundamentally," the requirement that organizers or 
sellers of tax shelters keep a list prevent the clients "from establishing an expectation of 
confidentiality in their communications with BDO, an essential element of the attorney-client 
privilege and, by extension, the § 7525 privilege.,,147 This rationale alone will preclude the 
application of either privilege to persons listed on th4ese required investor lists. 
E. Sufficiency of Privilege Log 
The courts have some flexibility to assess the suHiciency of a privilege logging the light 
of whether it would be unduly burdensome to require more,148 as long as the log provides 
sufficient information for the court to ascertain whether a privilege applies. 149 
In an interesting 2002 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia addressing the sufficiency of a corporate client's privilege log, reversed the trial 
court's decision and held that the corporation had made a sufficient showing that dissemination 
145 ld. at 811. 
146ld. at 812. 
1471d. 
148See, e.g., Public Servo Co. v. Portland Natural Gas, 218 F.R.O. 361 (O.N.H. 2003). 
149See United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F.Supp.2d 35 (D. D.C. 2002) (categorical log was insufficient there). 
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of the privileged documents was only to those who "needed to knoW."150 The appellate court 
held that the district court had erred in finding that the corporate defendant had waived its 
attorney-client privilege. 
The district court had imposed a burden on the corporation to explain why each 
employee, or public relations or governmental affairs consultant, who had received privileged 
information, had needed it. The Court of Appeals rejected this allocation of the burden: 
The applicable standard is, as the district court recognized, whether "the 
documents were distributed on a 'need to know' basis or to employees that were 
'authorized to speak or act' for the company." The Company's privilege log and 
the affidavit of Charles Kinzig establish that GSK circulated the documents in 
question only to specifically named employees and contractors, most of whom 
were attorneys or managers and all of whom "needed to provide input to the legal 
department and/or receive the legal advice and strategies formulated by counsel." 
The affidavit also states that each intended recipient was bound by corporate 
policy or, in the case of the contractors, by a separate understanding, to keep 
confidential the contents of the documents. The Company's submission thus leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that no document was "disseminated beyond those 
persons who, because of the corporate structure, needed to know its contents." 
The district court faulted GSK for not having explained "why any, let alone all, of 
the employees received copies of certain documents," and the Commission 
likewise claims on brief that GSK should have shown why each individual in 
possession of a confidential document "needed the information [therein] to carry 
out his/her work." These demands are overreaching. The Company's burden is to 
show that it limited its dissemination of the documents in keeping with their 
asserted confidentiality, not to justify each determination that a particular 
employee should have access to the information therein. Not only would that task 
be Herculean -- especially when the sender and the recipient are no longer with 
the Company -- but it is wholly unnecessary. After all, when a corporation 
provides a confidential document to certain specified employees or contractors 
with the admonition not to disseminate further its contents and the contents of the 
documents are related generally to the employees' corporate duties, absent 
evidence to the contrary we may reasonably infer that the information was 
deemed necessary for the employees' or contractors' work. Compare Coastal 
States, 617 F.2d at 863 (confidentiality lost when organization "admitted that it 
does not know who has had access to the documents, and there is undisputed 
testimony that ... copies of the memoranda were circulated to all area offices"). 
We do not presume, therefore, that any business would include in a restricted 
150Federal Trade Comm'n v. Glaxosmithkline, 294 F.3d 141,147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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circulation list a person with no reason to have access to the confidential 
document--that is, one who has no "need to know." 
Moreover, we can imagine no useful purpose in having a court review the 
business judgment of each corporate official who deemed it necessary or desirable 
for a particular employee or contractor to have access to a corporate secret. It 
suffices instead that the corporation limited dissemination to specific individuals 
whose corporate duties relate generally to the contents of the documents. As we 
have seen in this case, the privilege log and the Kinzig Declaration together 
establish that GSK did just that, and the Company thereby demonstrated its 
entitlement to the attorney-client privilege. The FTC has profTered nothing to the 
contrary. 151 
F. Government Lawyers 
Government lawyers, like other lawyers, enjoy the qualified privilege of the attorney 
work product doctrine. 152 But the attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, is likely 
inapplicable to communications between a government lawyer and a public official, when 
criminal proceedings are involved. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an important decision 
regarding the attorney-client privilege as it applies with regard to government lawyers, has held 
that in criminal proceedings, no attorney-client privilege exists for confidential communications 
between government officials and government lawyers. 153 
Federal prosecutors investigating a bribery scandal in the Illinois Secretary of State's 
Office during the previous gubernatorial administration sought to interview the attorney who had 
been Chief Legal Counsel to that office, during former Secretary of State Ryan's tenure. Ryan 
asserted his attorney-client privilege. 
The federal district court granted the U.S. Attorney's motion to compel the attorney to 
testify about conversations he had had with Ryan in his official capacity as General Counsel. In a 
thoughtful opinion by Judge Diane Wood, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed: 
ISIFederal Trade Comm'n v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
IS2Eg , Audio Investments v. Robertson, 67 Fed. Appx. 795,2003 WL 21387196 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(IRS lawyers' theory of the case was protected from discovery). 
153 In Re. A Witness before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2,288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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[H]ere, we have a special case: the client is neither a private individual nor a 
private corporation. It is instead the State of Illinois itself~ represented through 
one of its agencies. There is surprisingly little case law on whether a government 
agency may also be a client for purposes of this [attorney-client] privilege, but 
both parties here concede that, at least in the civil and regulatory context, the 
government is entitled to the same attorney-client privilege as any other client. 
* * * 
While we recognize the need for full and frank communication between 
government officials, we are more persuaded by the serious arguments against 
extending the attorney-client privilege to protect communications between 
government lawyers and the public officials they serve when criminal proceedings 
are at issue. First, government lawyers have responsibilities and obligations 
different from those facing members of the private bar. While the latter are 
appropriately concerned first and foremost with protecting their clients -- even 
those engaged in wrongdoing -- from criminal charges and public exposure, 
government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the public interest. 
* * * 
Individuals and corporations are both subject to criminal liability for their 
transgressions. Individuals will not talk and corporations will have no incentive 
to conduct or cooperate in internal investigations if they know that any 
information disclosed may be turned over to authorities. A state agency, however, 
cannot be held criminally liable by either the state itself or the federal government. 
There is thus no need to offer the attorney-client privilege as an incentive to 
increase compliance with the laws. 
In the final analysis, reason and experience dictate that the lack of criminal 
liability for government agencies and the duty of public lawyers to uphold the law 
and foster an open and accountable government outweigh any need for a privilege 
in this context. An officeholder wary of becoming enmeshed in illegal acts may 
always consult with a private attorney, and there the privilege unquestionably 
would apply. While Ryan fears that our refusal to recognize a privilege will cause 
even the most trivial of matters to be taken to outside counsel, this strikes us as 
unduly alarmist. 
In fact, analogous rules apply in the corporate realm, where attorneys are 
repeatedly admonished to advise corporate officials that they are not personal 
clients of the attorney and may wish to retain other counsel. These rules do not 
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appear to have stifled corporate discussion or proved impossible to administer, 
and we see no reason why a similar result cannot be countenanced here. 154 
v. Priest-Penitent Privilege 
Q24. The Government subpoenas Taxpayer's Priest to testify that Taxpayer confessed to 
Priest that she had cheated on her taxes. Taxpayer moves to quash on the ground of 
priest-penitent privilege. What result? Is there a federal priest-penitent privilege? 
If so, who holds it? 
The existence at the common law, after the Reformation, of a privilege protecting 
confidential communications between priest and penitent is dubious. 155 Many states have 
adopted statutes codifying such a privilege. Maryland's statute, for example, provides: "A 
minister of the gospel, priest, or member of the clergy of an established church of any 
denomination may not be compelled to testify on any matter in relation to any confession or 
communication made to him in confidence by a person seeking his spiritual advice or 
consolation." 156 
The rationale for the privilege is that it is in the interest of society to encourage 
individuals to confess their wrongs to and to seek help from their spiritual leaders; it also may be 
that compulsion by the courts of a minister to disclose such a person's confidences smacks of 
governmental interference in matters ofreligion. 157 
154 In Re: A Witness before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 291-94 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
155COX v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1273 (U.S. 2003); Mullen v. United 
States, 263 F.2d 275,278 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy & Edgerton, J.J., concurring); 1 McCormick § 76.2 at 286; 8 
Wigmore § 2394. See Seidman v. Fishbume-Judgins Educ. Foundation, Inc., 724 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1984) 
("The priest-penitent or clergyman-communicant privilege has no firm foundation in common law."); Proposed Fed. 
R. Evid. 506, advisory committee note ("The considerations which dictate the recognition of privileges generally 
seem strongly to favor a privilege for confidential communications to clergymen. During the period when most of 
the common law privileges were taking shape, no clear-cut privilege for communications between priest and penitent 
emerged."); Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 Jurist 328 (1976). Cf Pagano v. 
Hadley, 100 F.R.D. 758 (D. Del. 1984) (no First Amendment priest-penitent privilege, but Del. R. Evid. 505 applies 
in civil rights defamation suit to protect confidential communications from plaintiff priest to his bishop). 
156Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 9~111 (1998 RepI.Vol.). See also Note, The Clergy-Communicant 
Privilege: Blessed are the Meek, for They Shall Remain Silent, 65 N.C.L.Rev. 1390 (1987). 
1574 J. Bentham, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 588 (l.S. Mill ed. 1827) ("[W]ith any idea of toleration, a 
coercion of this nature is altogether inconsistent ***'''); Brocker, Sacred Secrets.' A Callfor the Expansive 
Application and Interpretation of the Clergy~Commlinicant Privilege, 37 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 455 (1991). See 
generally 8 Wigmore § 2396; Blaes, Penitent Privilege Under the New Code, 33 Kan. BJ. 279 (1964); Hogan, A 
Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 Loy.L.Rev. I (1951); Kuhlman, Communications to 
Clergymen-When Are They Privileged? 2 VaI.U.L.Rev. 265 (1968); Reese, Confidential Communications to the 
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It has been argued that the privilege itself is unconstitutional as an establishment of 
religion. '58 In light of Supreme Court decisions construing the establishment clause, 159 that 
argument seems unlikely to succeed. 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 permits federal courts to recognize privileges at common law "in the 
light of reason and experience." Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, several federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, had alluded to a priest-penitent privilege under 
common law principles pertaining to confidentiality.'60 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 would have codified a "clergyman" privilege, under 
which a person making confidential communications '61 to a cleric in his or her professional 
Clergy, 24 Ohio St. L.1. 55 (1963); Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on the Grounds o/Religion and 
Conscience, 62 Ky.L.J. 377 (1974); Note, Catholic Sisters, Irregularly Ordained Women and the Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege, 9 U.C.O.L.Rev. 523 (1976); Annots.,71 A.L.R.3d 794 (1976); 49 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1973); 22 A.L.R.2d 
1152(1952). 
158 1 McCormick § 76.2 at 287 & n. II; Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes: 
Let Free Exercise Govern, 62 Ind.L.J. 397 (1987). Cf Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 
S.Ct. 1273 (U.S. 2003) (rejecting habeas claim that New York violated Establishment Clause in not protecting 
defendant's statements to other AA members; federal court of appeals resolved case based on finding that defendant 
was not seeking "spiritual guidance," as required by New York statute). 
159E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984). 
160United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108,41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) ("[G]enerally, *** a 
priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.") (dictum); Totten v. 
United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105, 107,23 L.Ed. 605 (1875) ("[S]uits cannot be maintained which would require a 
disclosure of the confidences of the confessional ***.") (dictum); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277~80 
(O.C.Cir.1958) (Fahy & Edgerton, JJ., concurring); In re Verplank, 329 F.Supp. 433, 434~36 (C.O.Ca1.l971). See 
United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir.1971) (privilege unavailable when letter to priest contained no hint that 
its contents were to be kept secret and was not written "to obtain religious or other counsel, advice, solace, 
absolution or ministration"); Orfield, Privileges in Federal Criminal Evidence, 40 U. Detroit L.J. 403, 414~ 15 
(1963). See generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. Fed. 449 (1994). 
161 The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 explains: 
The definition of "confidential" communication is consistent with the use of the tenn in Rule 
503(a)(5) for lawyer-client and in Rule 504(a)(3) for psychotherapist-patient, suitably adapted to 
communications to clergymen. 
*** The choice between a privilege narrowly restricted to doctrinally required confessions and a 
privilege broadly applicable to all confidential communications with a clergyman in his professional 
character as spiritual adviser has been exercised in favor of the latter. Many clergymen now receive 
training in marriage counseling and the handling of personality problems. Matters of this kind fall readily 
into the realm of the spirit. The same considerations which underlie the psychotherapist-patient privilege of 
Rule 504 suggest a broad application of the privilege for communications to clergymen. 
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character as spiritual adviser 162 would have a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
another from disclosing those communications. 163 
The privilege, as proposed, would have survived the confider's death. l64 It could be 
claimed by the confider, if alive, or on the confider's behalf by the confider's guardian, 
conservator, or personal representative. 165 
See United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (confession to prison chaplain in presence of 
guard not confidential). 
162See United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1987) (communications were not privileged when 
clergyman was sought out only for income tax avoidance); United States v. Gordon, 493 F.Supp. 822 (N.D.N.Y. 
1980) (communications regarding business matters, with person on leave from priesthood, not privileged), ajJ'd, 655 
F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981). 
163Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 provides: 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(I) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary ofa religious 
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him. 
(2) A communication is "confidential" ifmade privately and not intended for further 
disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional 
character as spiritual adviser. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his guardian or 
conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The clergyman may claim the privilege on 
behalf of the person. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Un if. R. Evid. 505 (1999) is substantially identical, except that it also specifically lists "Christian Science 
practitioner" in (a)(1). See Ellis v. United States, 922 F.Supp. 539 (D.Utah 1996) (church officials' communications 
to church leaders about church members' drowning during trip were not made for spiritual purposes and were not 
protected communications); United States v. Mohanlal, 867 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (privilege does not extend 
to minister's conclusion that communicant knows right from wrong). 
Unif.R.Evid. 505 is identical to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506, except for the last sentence of subsection (c). 
In the Uniform Rule, that sentence reads: "The person who was the clergyman at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the communicant." 
164Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506(c). 
1651d. The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 explains: 
Subdivision (c) makes clear that the privilege belongs to the communicating person. However, a prima 
facie authority on the part of the clergyman to claim the privilege on behalf of the person is recognized. 
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Although it was not enacted, proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 has influenced post-rules federal 
decisions recognizing a priest-penitent privilege. 166 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 differs from statutes such as Maryland's in several significant 
ways. The proposed federal privilege is held by the confider or confessor, not by the cleric; 
under the federal approach, the priest may assert the privilege on behalf of the confider but 
cannot waive the privilege. 167 
"Clergyman" is defined more broadly in the proposed federal rule, as "a minister, priest, 
rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious organization or an individual reasonably 
believed so to be by the person consulting him."'68 The proposed rule provides '69-and the 
The discipline of the particular church and the discreetness of the clergyman are believed to constitute 
sufficient safeguards for the absent communicating person. 
166E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380-81 (3d Cir.1990). Cf In re Verplank, 329 F.Supp. 
433,435-36 (C.O.CaI.1971) (influenced by early draft). See generally Developments in the Law.' Privileged 
Communications, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 1450, 1552--63 (1985). 
167See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506(b) & Advisory Committee note. See also Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 938 
F.Supp. 1516, 1521 (O.Ore. 1996) (under Oregon law, privilege belongs to the penitent; tape recording jailhouse 
confession infringed priest's free exercise of religion), rev'd, 104 FJd 1522 (9th Cir. 1997); Oe'Udy v. Oe'Udy, 130 
Misc.2d 168,495 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1985) (under New York law, the priest-penitent privilege belongs to the 
communicant, not the clergyman; the communicant may waive it). See generally Imwinkelreid, THE NEW WIGMORE 
§§ 6.23 & 6.5.1 at 553-55. 
168Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506(a)(l). The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 explains: 
Subdivision (a). Paragraph (1) defines a clergyman as a "minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar 
functionary of a religious organization." The concept is necessarily broader than that inherent in the 
ministerial exemption for purposes of Selective Service. See United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936 (4th 
Cir.1966). However, it is not so broad as to include all self-denominated "ministers." A fair 
construction of the language requires that the person to whom the status is sought to be attached be 
regularly engaged in activities conforming at least in a general way with those of a Catholic priest, Jewish 
rabbi, or minister of an established Protestant denomination, though not necessarily on a full-time basis. No 
further specification seems possible in view of the lack oflicensing and certification procedures for 
clergymen. However, this lack seems to have occasioned no particular difficulties in connection with the 
solemnization of marriages, which suggests that none may be anticipated here. For similar definitions of 
"clergyman" see California Evidence Code § 1030; New Jersey Evidence Rule 29. 
The "reasonable belief" provision finds support in similar provisions for lawyer-client in Rule 503 
and for psychotherapist-patient in Rule 504. A parallel is also found in the recognition of the validity of 
marriages perfonned by unauthorized persons if the parties reasonably believed them legally qualified. 
Harper and Skolnick, Problems of the Family 153 (Rev. Ed. 1962). 
169Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506(a)(2). 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held I7°-that the privilege extends 
to communications made in the presence of "other persons present in furtherance of the 
purpose of the communication." Under the proposed federal rule, the confider can prevent 
disclosure, even by an eavesdropper whom the confider did not know to be present during the 
communication. 17! 
The advisory committee note to Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 makes plain the drafters' 
intent to exclude from the protection of the privilege any communications made in 
furtherance of fraud or crime.!72 Whether to require a cleric's reporting of suspected child 
abuse is a topical issue in America and abroad. 173 
The proposed federal privilege explicitly provides that it survives the confider's death. 
But in a dramatic federal case in New York, a Catholic priest testified - after his parishioner's 
death - that the parishioner had confided to the priest that he - not his two friends who had 
been convicted - was guilty of murder.!74 At least one of the friends was then released. 175 
!70In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 386 (3d Cir.1990) (privilege may extend even to 
communications made during a group counseling session, as long as the presence of any third parties was both 
"essential to and in furtherance of a communication to a member of the clergy.") (emphasis in original) (remanding 
case for further factual findings). See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Knoche), 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.1990) (finding 
federal common law privilege but remanding as to whether, e.g., confidentiality was expected in group session). See 
also Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610 (D. Utah 1990) (in diversity case, applicable Utah statutory clergy-penitent 
privilege was construed to embrace more than confessions and to include communications that are confidential under 
the religious teachings of a particular faith; court recognized free exercise and establishment issues; privilege 
protected both (I) child abuse defendant's communications made to Mormon bishop and another for purpose of 
receiving church counseling and ecclesiastical advice and (2) intra-faith communications from one ecclesiastical 
officer to another for the purpose of carrying out church discipl ine). 
!7!Proposed FRE 506, advisory committee note ("Under the privilege as phrased, the communicating person is 
entitled to prevent disclosure not only by himself but also by the clergyman and by eavesdroppers. "). See Mockaitis 
v. Harcleroad, 938 F.Supp. 1516 (D.Ore. 1996) (declining to reach the question). 
I72Proposed FRE 506, advisory committee note ("The nature of what may reasonably be considered spiritual 
advice makes it unnecessary to include in the rule a specific exception for communications in furtherance of crime or 
fraud, as in Rule 503( d)( 1). "). 
I73See Bonthrone, Clergy "May Be Urged to Reveal Secrets ", London Daily Telegraph, Feb. 19,2002 (draft 
document of Church of England may require disclosure of information where necessary to protect children). 
174Priest Reveals Murder ConfeSSion, Raising Legal and Ethical Questions, The Baltimore Sun, 4A, col. 4, Jul. 
24,2001. 
!75Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F.Supp.2d 706 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (granting writ of habeas corpus); Man Convicted 
of Murder Freed on Priest's Testimony, The Baltimore Sun, 2A, col. 6, Jul. 25, 2001); N.Y.L.J. 3, col. I, Aug. 10, 
2001; Morvillo & Anello, The Clergy-Communicant Privilege, N. Y.L.J. 3 (Oct. 2, 200 I). 
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